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The thesis examines conditions and nature of securitisation of a rhinoceros anti-
poaching response in South Africa after 2010. In a surge of rising numbers of animals 
being illegally hunt for their horns and other parts, the country awoke in a scramble 
over effective mitigation measures. Through lenses of securitisation theory, I analyse 
historical and social contexts, that led a range of state and non-state actors in framing 
rhinoceros poaching as an emergency and helped in proclaiming it a national security 
threat. Aimed to secure the survival of rhinoceros in South Africa and beyond, the 
securitisation was achieved through chain of practices that have been introduced over 
the last decade in the country. Applying sociological understanding of the theory that 
draws on Bourdieu’s concept of the field and Foucauldian elements of theory of 
governmentality, I focus on evolving character of such practices, which effected in a 
securitised response to poaching. According to this approach, actors and audience 
inclined in power relations produce new meanings and practices that aim to eliminate, 
the threat. They do so by applying extraordinary measures, such as creating new 
policies or drawing attention and resources to the pronounced threat. I argue that 
international actors initiated the security framing of broader wildlife crime issues, 
which South Africa eventually accepted and reinforced as a dominant narrative. 
Aligning with the global actors was possible because of the historical security-based 
politics and aimed to achieve more favourable image of country’s tourism industry 
and attract financial support. On the other hand, donors’ help did not come without 
interests. These were linked to Western-oriented concepts of nature and wildlife 
conservation informed by security discourse. By using national security as a 
justification for extraordinary measures, such as delegating anti-poaching agenda to 
the security cluster or allocating more funds to it, South Africa was able to gain more 
control over resources rich areas though applying wildlife security narrative.  
The research utilises information from South African government agencies, non-
governmental organisation as well as other actors engaged in broadly understood 
conservation topic within last decade. By analysing laws, strategies, policies, official 
briefings, independent and academic reports as well as media articles, I construct a 
timeline of practices that led to securitising the rhinoceros anti-poaching strategies. 
The thesis comprises of review of the existing literature on security and securitisation 
studies as well as critical analysis of trends global environmental politics, followed 
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by specific theoretical approach and methodology that allows to analyse key elements. 
The research concludes with identifying potential risks and opportunities of 
securitisation, depending on development scenarios and provides the list of 
recommendations to mitigate potential negative impacts. 
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CHAPTER 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW, ARGUMENT AND RESEARCH 
QUESTION  
  Introduction  
The problem of illegal hunting and trafficking in wildlife on global scale taps into the 
insecurities originating from the Cold War. Continuing the reproduction of security 
regimes, many governments look for new territories to deploy their armies and 
cultural paradigms. In this new arrangement, global actors find themselves translating 
national security into language of emerging challenges. Between these, a special place 
on the map of global insecurities takes Southern hemisphere with abundance of 
natural resources, which the North increasingly sees as desirable. Without recognizing 
the harm that once have crippled development of the south, a scramble over the 
African continent has new disguise – environmental security. A broad term, it has 
been discussed within growing complexity over past few decades. Within it, the 
environmental crime and, specifically, wildlife crime. Still a multifaceted 
phenomenon, it has been translated into global politics through images of endangered 
wildlife and a wilderness, concepts stemming from neo-colonial nostalgia. These 
narratives have been successfully informing the understanding of what nature is and 
how it should be protected. In such asymmetric global power relations, (southern) 
Africa became a symbol of a quest in the name of development and peace. These ideas 
have gained more currency when emerging markets, political changes and carefully 
doctored social inequalities created a demand-supply chain for the wild rarities. It has 
resulted is an enormous illegal market of wild fauna and flora. In an intersection of 
transnational organised crime, social development and neoliberal conservation, a 
recycled security regime emerged. This thesis is examining a specific occurrence of 
such redressed security process/practices, that have materialised in South Africa in a 
dawn of wildlife crime surge. Informed by the theoretical framework of securitization 
studies I examine these practices to in order to understand if and how South African 
governmental agencies created conditions for securitised response to a problem of 
poaching of one of the country’s natural capital and pride – the illegal killing of 
rhinoceros. By focusing on the anti-poaching strategy for this specific species I 
analyse background of such security frame, its development and changing power 
narratives that contributes to producing the militarised responses that bear a risk of 




Academic literature has started to discuss these, but, despite engaging with security 
studies terminology, there has been only a handful of researches that apply a 
theoretical framework in its full extend, not peripheries. For that reason, I have 
decided to engage with the topic of wildlife crime by focusing on one of the ‘global 
hotspots’: making headlines for ‘rhino wars’ and an experimental ground for different 
anti-wildlife crime strategies, South Africa’s ‘rhino safety and security’ approach 
became a choice. Given a proliferation of politics, conservation and business 
narratives, it is important to closely observe the constantly changing picture, where 
violence become a symbol of development much like in the pre-1994 era. Secondly, 
it is important to interrogate academic and policy discourses themselves. Informed by 
specific schools of thoughts they provide certain background as part of the power 
struggles over the ‘right’/correct description of reality. Aware of this paradigmatic 
approach, I aim to answer the question on how has the securitisation of the rhinoceros 
anti- poaching agenda reshaped mechanisms of conservation in South Africa since 
2010. The research comprises of discursive and document analysis of actors involved 
and regimes of practices they apply to produce security response. The analysis of 
context supports understanding of why such practices have been more successful than 
others and how they have been used within broader conservation practices, that in 
South Africa have converged with global financial regimes. I then discuss one of the 
impacts of such regime of practice with brings plethora of critique from various 
streams of scholars. By all that I aim to determine the nature and level of success of 
securitisation process that I claim has occurred in South African politics regarding the 
rhinoceros. The thesis consists of four chapters. The first discussed the most important 
developments in academic literature, directions and gaps that I aim to address through 
this thesis. Chapter 2 provides a more comprehensive idea of security studies, 
followed by a methodology subchapter with an explanation of a paradigmatic 
approach and employed analytical strategy. Chapter 3 consists of an analysis of 
collected material and findings, while chapter 4 provides summary of the research and 






 Security and environment 
Growing global efforts have been directed towards environmental pressures since the 
early 1970s, when political debate began to address such problems in the context of 
security (Falk, 1971). The evolution of the concept of ‘environmental threat’ began 
with the 1972 Human Environment conference in Stockholm, and by 1987 had 
resulted in the coining of the term ‘environmental security’, which appeared in the 
World Commission on Environment and Development Report (UN, 1987), known as 
the Brundtland Report. Few years later, separate development of the environmental 
security notion strengthened the conservation doctrine during the Earth Summit in 
1992, which brought, inter alia, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) that explicitly identified threats to further existence of flora and 
fauna, that in result threaten human existence. In 2007, the United Nations Security 
Council held discussions regarding the security implications of climate change, albeit 
inconclusively (United National Security Council, 2007).  Nevertheless, the narrative 
of a proliferation of threats, deepening scarcity of natural resources, aggressive 
pollution and progressive loss of biodiversity gained greater political importance in 
subsequent years and has been utilised by a collective of international actors in what 
is considered a sub-area of environmental protection, namely, conservation of natural 
resources. Within this theme, conservation of wildlife globally became of special 
concern, as reflected by the establishment of the Convention on International Trade 
of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1973 and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992.  
Over the past two decades, researchers have considered how a convergence of politics, 
protection of the natural environment, and security has produced new conservation 
regimes, as well as the potential and real impacts of associated mechanisms. This 
chapter examines the different bodies of scholarship that explore the new merging of 
environment, politics and capital found in securitisation theory, and the tradition of 
political ecology, focussing on phenomena of nature conservation, environmental 
security and international organised crime. In following paragraphs, I firstly briefly 
explained the term ‘securitisation’, which I expand upon in chapter 2, and continue 
with a mapping of selected literature that critically contributes to the topic of 




A wider definition of ‘securitisation’ has been problematised by Buzan, Wæver, and 
de Wilde (1998) as referring to sectors other than the exclusively military. According 
to the authors, after the end of the Cold War, the definition of security should have 
been redefined and widened to reflect changes underway in global politics, such as 
the environment.  
Dubbed ‘Copenhagen school of security studies’ (CS) has since been developed and 
defined, predominantly by Thierry Balzacq, whose approach to securitisation theory 
will be applied in this thesis. His main claim is that the process ‘is a rule-governed 
practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real 
threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a 
specific complexion’ (Balzacq, 2005: 179).  
Arisen from the Copenhagen School new framework of analysis initiate the 
environmental security studies (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998) analysing its 
character in the dawn of environmental crime and climate change. Trombetta (2008) 
critiques the definition of securitisation according to the Copenhagen school, and 
raises the question of the extent to which environmental problems, for example 
climate change, produce new forms of securitisation, where identification of an enemy 
and what is called a ‘securitising move’1 are not necessary. Similarly, the urgency of 
situation, as proclaimed by Copenhagen School is only rhetorical, as the climate 
change framework being only recently established, it is impossible to act immediately.  
In this sense, environmental securitisation transforms the security practices and 
provisions by expanding the logic of securitisation provided by Copenhagen scholars 
((Trombetta, 2011: 148). Environmental security should, therefore, be seen as non-
conventional; my approach to the subject and its body of research will reflect that. 
Floyd (2008) gives an overview of environmental security developments in the United 
States (US) and their significance. Military involvement (such as US defence 
environmental strategy) creates environmental insecurities, amongst others, (Ibid: 
52), recalling the Toronto group and Douglas Homer-Dixon’s thesis (199) of 
environmental conflict being triggered by environmental resource scarcity (Kaplan, 
                                                          
1 As defined by Wæver, Buzan de Wilde (1998), securitising move is a speech act that proclaims a 
threat and measures. Later school scholars, such as Michael Williams (2003) or Balzacq (2011) 
argued that securitising move is constituted by equally verbal and non-verbal (practices) acts. See 




1994). Many later studies provide an opposite conclusion, however, contending that 
it is an abundance of resources that leads to them desired on a global scale. These two 
concepts are rejected by ecologists, who argue that neither abundance nor scarcity 
should be the starting point of the debate, as they are the product of relations between 
‘political economy and mechanisms of access, control, and struggle over 
environmental resources’ (Peluso & Watts, 2001: 93). Environmental security, as 
Floyd argues, is also understood as human security. Finally, she highlights de-
securitising efforts undertaken through environmental peacebuilding, realised through 
projects such as cross-border conservation areas (Floyd, 2008: 60).  
Dalby (2013) and Gemenne et al. (2014) provide a similar overview of developments 
in environmental security, but stress asymmetric power relations that, if accompanied 
by poorly applied global environmental policies that do not secure access to resources 
and land for the most vulnerable communities, will inevitably bring large-scale 
insecurities and conflict. The conclusion to be taken from the above literature is a 
recurring theme of environmental justice as an outcome of global power dynamics.  
Environmental resource policies, including wildlife, during the Bill Clinton and 
George Bush administrations analysed through the lenses of securitisation (and 
desecuritisation) framework show main contribution to the discussion. Firstly, of the 
moral judgement in relation to the human security that has not been developed despite 
myriads of policies. Secondly, due to a lack of understanding of the fact that 
sustainable development is not the same as ‘economic development’ (Floyd, 2010: 
179).  Finally, this issue was only considered to be of concern when associated with 
underdevelopment, and as such could lead to terrorism. This powerful research shows 
that a terrorism narrative, conveniently linked to any available security threat, real or 
not, has been present in US foreign policy long before wildlife trafficking was treated 
as a transnational organised crime.  
Wildlife crime analysed through the lens of securitisation theory has only recently 
started to be explored (Elliott and Schaedla, 2016). In a chapter dedicated to 
securitisation of transnational environmental crime (TEC) and militarisation of 
conservation in Africa, Elliott (2016) summarises the concerns of many scholars 
collectively associated with the political ecology school of thought, bringing long 
historical assemblages of state and non-state actors including private security firms, 




outlines the development of the threat narrative and unjustified claims of local and 
foreign political actors that link poaching and wildlife trafficking to terrorist or other 
criminal groups while overlooking the extent of wildlife crime and actors involved in 
it along with colonial and postcolonial security and policing methods employed by 
existing state regimes. She concludes: ‘the risk of narrowing the policy focus to one 
of defence against threat rather than one which seeks to address the causes of 
insecurities […] may well be counterproductive in responding to the challenges of 
transnational environmental crime’ (Elliott, 2016: 83).  South Africa’s contribution to 
the development of the illegal wildlife trade while fetishizing the concept of foreign 
force as threat is highlighted, as is the criminalisation of local populations within a 
culture of impunity. Nevertheless, the country is not the sole focus. Despite being the 
leading example of wildlife crime hotspot in the relevant literature, South Africa is 
not examined through the prism of securitisation theory.  
Recent academic literature analyses environmental politics from the perspective of 
Michel Foucault’s (2007) theory governmentality (Fletcher, 2017) 2 or, by considering 
the transition from the politics of science to that of pre-emption in the light of a 
wildlife crime (or broadly environmental) emergency (Büscher, 2017). In this thesis, 
I apply such an understanding of the response to precariousness, manifested through 
the surge in wildlife crime. However, I argue that such precariousness is produced by, 
and is in fact one of, the main securitising practices through which state and non-state 
actors gain control and benefit.  
Above selection of the literature is an excerpt from a wide scholarship on security-
environment nexus. It lays a foundation for the analysis of development and 
mechanisms of responses to environmental crime and provide a setting for the 
                                                          
2 Fletcher uses late Foucault’s concept of multiple governmentalities (Foucault, 2007) to analyse 
environmental politics and consequences such different forms of governmentalities may have on the 
future of environment and politics itself. The text is one of few analyses that applies concepts present 
in securitisation analyses. It does not however, relate to a specific South African context, but rather, 
provide an interesting description of theoretical landscape that is emerging in analysis of 





research. Based on outlined theoretical concepts I zoom into the specific phenomenon 
and use them to unpack security response to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa.  
 Political ecology  
Aside from international relations, governmentality and security studies, a significant 
body of literature3 situated in the field of political ecology provides analysis of aspects 
of security and environment. The main thread of discussion focuses on the ways in 
which the environment in general, and conservation practices in particular, are being 
instrumentalised to further security agendas. This, according to the authors, is done in 
the interest of security, or in the interest of financial gains effected through land 
appropriation, ‘primitive’ accumulation and natural resource control. Many of the 
scholars point towards consequences of these practices that change the landscape of 
conservation globally, the effects of which are often borne by several segments of 
society, reinforcing historical inequalities. In conservation (and global environmental 
governance), specifically in relation to wildlife protection measures, the so-called 
‘wildlife poaching and trafficking crisis’ is being used to capture attention and 
resources that in turn generates more attention among involved actors such as civil 
society, governmental, and inter-governmental organisations. Ali (2007) and 
Ramutsindela (2007) outline ways of embedding security, including human security, 
into environmental protection, drawing on the idea that geopolitical peace and security 
can be delivered through ‘peace parks’, or Transfrontier Conservation Areas 
(hereafter TFCA). The author discusses the promise and shortfalls of a solution that 
brings with it the history of forced resettlement or land appropriation for conservation 
means (Ramutsindela, 2007, 103-20).  The story of TFCAs sets the scene for deeper 
analysis of conservation goals and methods, predominantly in southern Africa. It 
explores how the concept of environmental protection, or more specifically, 
conservation, evolved into a new powerful narrative where ecology may supposedly 
be achieved through peace, scrupulously utilising South Africa’s obsessive policing 
and constant state of (in)security manifested though the entrepreneurial Peace Parks 
Foundation (Massé & Lunstrum, 2016: 231).  
                                                          
3 See: Peluso and Vandergeest (2011), Ojeda (2012), Ybarra (2012), Humphreys and Smith (2011), 
Humphreys and Smith (2014), Lunstrum (2014), White (2014), Duffy et al. (2015), Duffy (2016), 
Cavanagh & Himmelfarb (2015), Lombard (2016), Massé & Lunstrum (2016), Marijnen and 




The landscape of southern African efforts in securitising the responses to poaching 
and wildlife trafficking has been described in various terms, focussing on a variety of 
aspects. The growing body of political ecology literature has been impacted by the 
term ‘green militarisation’ (Lunstrum, 2014) as a direct effect of the merging of fields 
of security and conservation. The militarisation of South Africa, although not new to 
security studies4, brings a new field into focus – ‘the use of military, and paramilitary 
(military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of 
conservation’ (Lunstrum, 2014: 817). This research provides historical and semantic 
analysis of the development of a securitised response to the poaching crisis but does 
not unpack the mechanisms and interests of actors involved in these interesting power 
assemblages.  
Although the theme of violence in conservation has been researched in the past (Ellis, 
1994, Neumann, 2004), Lunstrum, rightfully, problematises it as an emerging trend 
in conservation. Drawing on it, Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016) deepen the theme 
by exploring other types of ‘green violence’, including material green violence (or 
militarisation, in Lunstrum’s terms), and social and online (or web 2.0) violence 
(explored elsewhere by Büscher, 2015). Each occurs through a range of actions 
performed by actors involved: government and its agencies, non-profit organisations 
forging their own vision of conservation in South Africa, private para-military 
companies used to protect reserves and parks, or hybrids of the above. What is implied 
by the authors’ definition is the illegality of practices applied (Büscher & 
Ramutsindela, 2016: 8). It then has to be portrayed as war for wildlife (Duffy, 2016) 
and enable other agents to force their aims, that in return effects in socio-economic 
marginalisation of local inhabitants who do not ‘fit’ the idea of pristine wilderness 
zones (Büscher et al, 2012). The process further reinforces land dispossession on the 
one hand and accumulation of capital (resource and control over it) on the other, 
leaving certain social groups ‘out of the picture’, treating them as surplus (Murray Li, 
2012) and unnecessary in the production and implementation of the new vision of 
parks in Southern Africa. In response, those excluded feel not only denied 
opportunities, but simultaneously experience the reinforcement of historical 
inequalities (Hübschle 2016b).  
                                                          




Duffy et al. (2015a) point towards implications of such enclosure as potentially 
enabling the ‘production’ of poachers. One of the most discussed and equally critiqued 
forces that researchers point to as mechanisms of financialisaton, marketisation, 
privatisation, commodification, and decentralisation within conservation governance 
are grouped under the term ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Igoe & Brockington, 2007; 
Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). For Brockington and Duffy (2011), Igoe, (2010), and 
Arsel and Büscher (2012), neoliberal conservation is primarily market oriented, and 
is performed by predominantly northern hemisphere, or Western, non-governmental 
organisations, promoting win-win rhetoric through a) depoliticised cooperation 
between governments and non-profits, local governments and populations in what 
appear to be both conservation and development projects, b) limiting information on 
power relations and presenting it out of context, using social media and highly visual 
and emotive materials to appeal to the  predominantly Western audiences. Although 
Igoe (2010: 390) argues that this ‘360-degree marketing’ simplifies and strategizes 
narratives in campaigns that aim to maximise donations, I argue that such campaigns, 
especially in the eyes of audience, are not profoundly political. For both organisations 
and the audience, the message comes from cultural perspective and the socially 
constructed wilderness (Neumann, 2004: 816). However, it is important to note that 
some organisations may manipulate and perpetuate values that are profoundly 
discriminatory and informed by colonial logic (Hübschle, 2016:173-200).  
As pointed out by Büscher et al. (2012), one of the practices in forging neoliberal 
conservation is silencing unconventional narratives and those who promote them. The 
security agenda that enables neoliberal conservation goes further, however – it 
produces narratives that can effectively silence these voices. The idea of a poacher, or 
person hunting illegally, that is posing a threat and is of a threat himself/herself, is 
exploited by all actors in the creation of further narratives that justify linkage with 
security. Namely, the poacher is not simply one who hunts illegally – the poacher is a 
villain, a scrooge, member of criminal syndicate, heartless killer and a terrorist. Such 
framing, that plays with various symbolics, triggers further security practices – those 
of surveillance, counterinsurgency and militarisation (Duffy, 2016: 2). 
There are two elements from the concept that I apply in understanding practices 




resources for environmental ends’ (Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012), and b) 
narratives, especially referring to security, that accompany such green grabbing.  
 
  Accumulation by conservation  
In the rich literature on green grabbing, there are certain central concepts that ought 
to be explained. The first term, green grabbing5, constitutes appropriation of land and 
resources. The appropriation itself, as explained by Fairhead, Leeach and Scoones 
(2012: 238), assumes that ownership, usage rights and control of resources is 
transferred from public to private. This move includes power dynamics, where 
commons (and especially the poor) are disposed on the account of wealthy and 
powerful. Accumulation by dispossession is a further proliferation of accumulation 
practices performed by various actors, including governments. Accumulation can be 
primitive, where public land is bought by a private entity and inhabitants are expelled, 
or it can be the accumulation of capital, where profits from assets are captured and 
reinvested, concentrating (accumulating) its ownership. For example, profits from 
wildlife tourism that are not redistributed, but instead invested in buying more land.  
As explained by Büscher and Fletcher (2014: 275), accumulation is understood as 
referring to ‘broader systemic dynamics in global capitalism as a system of 
accumulation and the role of environmental conservation within this’. Authors expand 
on the definition of accumulation as per Doane (2012: 20), who explains the term as 
‘enclosure of value’ that occurs ‘when environmental organisations from the global 
North appropriate land that is already well preserved’.  
For (Corson & MacDonald, 2012: 264) green accumulation through green 
dispossession represents yet another form of ‘green grabbing’ which ‘entail[s] not 
only physical land grabs but also the privatization of rights to nature, the creation of 
new commodities and markets from nature, the green sanction for otherwise declining 
forms of capital accumulation and the disabling of institutions that could pose threats 
to expanded accumulation’. The notion of enclosure and land appropriation for 
environmental ends, including conservation, is being further explored by several 
                                                          
5 The term was first used by journalist John Vidal in the article for The Guardian, describing globally 
observed lands being bought, or appropriated, for environmental purposes by wealthy individuals or 





scholars.6 The more systematic analysis of security and neoliberal conservation is 
explored by Massé and Lunstrum (2016) and Kelly and Ybarra (2016); Duffy (2014); 
Duffy et al. (2015), Verweijen and Marijnen (2016) where we read how militarised 
attitudes towards conservation provide a platform for inter-state, state and 
international (other states or international non-governmental organisations) actors 
winning control over land and its resources, and how these impact local populations 
and the conservation agenda itself.  
 
 Security themes in political ecology scholarship 
Although security and securitisation processes and practices are being analysed from 
the perspective of impacts, there is little analysis to date on securitisation as a mode 
of governance, which aims to answer questions of how, who, why and under which 
circumstances securitisation occurs, followed by analysing not only impacts but also 
wider context, the parties involved and the underlying interests and status of these 
actors, as well as a deeper analysis of discourses that are being exercised: of control, 
politics of power and capital.  
Only a few scholars have touched upon the process of accumulation of resources by 
employing security and anti-poaching efforts in South Africa. As will be described in 
detail in the theory section, it requires focusing of resources on the putative security 
threat and is exercised through speech and performative acts. In the case of South 
Africa, as Humphreys and Smith (2014) argue, this has been happening through the 
process of ‘rhinofication’, where ‘rhino poaching and conservation in South Africa 
have become enveloped within a larger security narrative […] of national security that 
sees counter-poaching existing as part of a broad response to both external and internal 
threats to the state.’ This ‘fortress conservation’ in South Africa, according to the 
authors, is being exercised through application of ‘security’ discourse as a response 
to ‘attack from foreign nationals’ as proclaimed by Major General (Retired) Johan 
Jooste in late 2012, when he was appointed as the head of anti-poaching operations in 
South African National Parks (SANParks). Here, the authors point out that policies 
and practices of protection and conservation of one species leave many others 
                                                          
6 See: Corson (2011), Brockington and Duffy (2011), Kelly (2011), Peluso and Lund (2011), Matondi 




neglected and not sufficiently protected. However, what they do not address is the full 
network of actors, their practices and the context within which ‘rhinofication’ 
emerged. 
Rademeyer and Shaw (2016), however, contest the idea of an increasing militarisation 
of the response to rhinoceros poaching, arguing that it is only recently that poaching, 
and wildlife trafficking have been considered a security threat by South African 
governmental agencies. A deeper analysis of what resources have been introduced 
beyond ‘on-the-ground’ militarisation should be applied to better understand the 
context specific situation. Moreover, as authors argue, political ecology scholars do 
not differentiate between the discourse and reality. It provides a counterpoint in the 
discussion on securitisation and shows how it can be overlooked by focussing only on 
its visible practices, such as critiqued militarisation (Marijnen, 2017). The latter is 
rather an outcome of securitisation. Furthermore, securitisation does not have to be 
intentional (Balzacq, 2011), or reflected upon7.  
The main point of scholars writing about militarisation or rhinofication is the notion 
of a certain framework of action is inherited from an overly policed and polarised 
society in case of South Africa, where the response to insubordination was always 
heavy handed. In this sense, non-reflectively, South African Police Service (SAPS), 
the Directorate for Priority Crime (also known as Hawks), State Security Agency 
(SSA), South African National Defence Force (SANDF)8, the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA) and South African National Parks (SANParks) and a 
conglomerate of private actors (including security companies and non-profit 
organisations), further encouraged by public, mostly in the social media sphere 
(Büscher, 2016, Lunstrum, 2017), are heading unmistakeably towards the same anti-
poaching and conservation delivery model as during the apartheid era, which can be 
summarised through phrases like ‘war on poaching’. In this sense, the security agenda 
has been always present in South African conservation and has only been strengthened 
by the surge in poaching, ineffective responses to it, and pressure from international 
bodies.  
                                                          
7 See paragraphs on ‘habitus’ and ‘dispositif’ in Chapter 2 
8 SANDF forces have been deployed in the Kruger National Park (KNP) as a support for park rangers 





  Accumulation by Securitisation  
A broader explanatory spectrum is discussed by Massé and Lunstrum (2016) via the 
concept of accumulation through securitisation. It provides a vital base for the 
convergence of security, environmental conservation and market forces through 
which securitisation is enabled. In essence, authors explore the case of neoliberal 
conservation, where financial gain is intertwined with a political aspiration of the state 
to gain control through state and non-state actors across the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA), straddling the border region of South 
Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Specifically, its western, Mozambican side 
(called the Great Lembobo Conservancy – GLC), adjacent to Kruger National Park, 
is the scene of land and non-economic dispossession, or green grabbing, enabled by 
securitisation:’[a]ccumulation thus flows not directly from dispossession, although 
this is important, but more directly through promises and practices of security’ (Massé 
and Luntrum, 2016: 234).  
The authors further argue that it is security that is of concern to the South African 
state, rather than anti-poaching and conservation. As such, it is an actual ‘currency’ 
of the two states’ cooperation that further enables non-state actors to act upon the 
security concerns through land accumulation and dispossession. For the authors, 
securitisation is explored as a trigger of green accumulation, where state and non-state 
actors present highly rational objectives – those of land control and financial gains. 
Marijnen (2017) applies more of the specific securitisation theory but focusses on 
European Union practices of securitisation in Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Although they explain the mechanisms and practices taking place in the GLC, they 
fail to discuss the variety of actors involved, or the specific motives and contexts 
through which the security perspective is so powerful. That is, how the idea of security 
is specifically used to support the interests of those involved. The authors mention the 
nuances of securitisation theory, but do not address them in a rigorous manner. Neither 
they explain context, threat, or actors along with practices described as occurring in 
the GLC. Finally, the focus of the research is primarily on the GLC, although, while 
South Africa’s role in GLC politics is described as catalyst, the focus is on 




What is missing is an explicit analysis of the mechanisms that shape the current anti-
poaching agenda in South Africa. Despite the scholarship on security analysis, there 
is no research referencing the full-bodied securitisation theory as a analytical 
framework applied to examine environmental politics of response to wildlife crime or 
poaching specifically. The range of actors, unique history and resources that became 
of global concern show that a case of securitisation can be only analysed in a local 
context (South African) because of a specific confluence mirage of the context, actors, 
audience and security threat. Furthermore, if any actions should be taken to improve 
the situation, they should be undertaken within this very specific and carefully 
analysed context. 
 
  Argument and research question 
The literature review identifies incomplete research in various areas and conceptual 
levels. The theory of securitisation has not been specifically used to explain 
developments in the field of response to wildlife crime in South Africa. Various notion 
of security or securitisation have been analysed, but the literature does not employ the 
securitisation theory. In doing so I can fully interrogate security – anti-poaching nexus 
and unpack the current context, practices and actors involved: government, non- and 
intergovernmental organisations, civil society and illicit trade networks – all entangled 
in the process where securitised responses enable rather than disrupt illegal trade. So 
far, academics have focussed on specific geographies and phenomena that can be 
included in the securitisation narrative, but it has not been analysed within the 
securitisation theory framework. More specifically, South Africa, as a country, has 
never been case studied for its securitised anti-poaching discourse. Similarly, within 
the discussion on actual and potential impacts, literature has focussed on the most 
obvious militarised responses and the role they play in perpetuating historical 
narratives; however, it does so with an inconsistent focus on South Africa.  
Finally, the literature only modestly addresses the role of inter-governmental 
organisations in creating the securitised reality of the responses to rhino poaching and 
wider conservation efforts in South Africa. Highlighted gaps must be bridged to 
construct a new, more comprehensive approach that allows us to identify the 




different actors to capture and accumulate control over anti-poaching responses in 
South Africa. 
In the thesis, I address following questions: how are the agents involved in 
securitisation? (actors involved in securitisation including securitising actors, 
audiences or functional actors; power positions of these actors, personal identities or 
social identifies and referent object and subject); what is the context? (settings and 
socio-cultural dimension of analysed text material); what are the discursive and non-
discursive practices of securitisation being exercised in South Africa? How can they 
be observed and explained? How security responses impacted conservation practices 
in South Africa? Finally, whether mechanisms employed are a case of securitisation. 
All the above are underpinned by my research question: 
How has the response to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa been reshaped and 
securitised since 2010?  
As a result, I expect to produce a comprehensive study of the practices of identified 
actors in anti-poaching measures applied in public, political and legal spheres and 
exercised on the ground, defined as a securitisation of anti-poaching efforts and 
rhinoceros conservation, and the impact this approach achieves from the perspective 
of identified actors.   
 
  Conclusion  
This chapter allows to review existing literature on the intersection of security studies, 
political ecology that share the debate on progressively militarised conservation and 
methods applied to address the poaching of iconic species in Southern Africa, and 
here specifically, of the rhinoceros conservation and anti-poaching agenda, South 
African government applied. In the following chapter, I explain the theoretical 
approach to analyse the situation that developed in the country and why I employed 
it. I further provide methodological apparatus for the analysis of exiting data, that 





CHAPTER 2 - THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical and methodological approach to my research 
as well as methods applied. The first part is dedicated to a theoretical review of 
security and securitisation studies explaining the creation and evolution of the term 
and its meaning. The second section is dedicated specifically to a type of theory I 
intend to apply to my study and its definition, followed by situating the main premises 
of the research question within the theory. Finally, I present the methodological 
approach and methods I apply to address the research question.  
 
 Theory: situating the debate on securitisation 
The question of security, its definition and understanding has been broadly related to 
the field of international relations security studies. Securitisation theory emerges in 
the stream of non-traditional security studies, that defined a theme of security strictly 
related to the state and realised through military defence (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 
1998: 3). Authors initiated the new though school which argued that such ‘narrow’ 
understanding of security, that put the state in the centre of analysis, overlooks 
important changes in the way security has been understood and applied after the end 
of the Cold War.  
Within last 25 years securitisation has gained importance in attempts to better 
understand and describe mechanisms of these new fields of security interventions. 
Securitisation theory has allowed to answer the questions of why and how some public 
problems gain more security interest than others, how the commitment of collective 
participation in problems being established in such a prominent way is possible, and 
how various practices and instruments (legal or policy) can be created. Securitisation 
studies questions the very idea of security and the processes behind it, asking: what is 
a security issue? What is a definition of threat? What are the responses to it? How are 





The study of securitisation in the environmental sector has been neglected by scholars 
(see Chapter 1) and does not reflect the dynamic nature of the field. Furthermore, 
securitisation theory has never been used to describe a very specific subsection of 
global environmental politics, that of conservation and anti-poaching approaches to 
what has been expressively captured as ‘poaching crisis’, part of a wider spectrum of 
offences labelled as illegal wildlife trade, international environmental crime or 
wildlife trafficking. I aim to address this gap by exploring the politics of response to 
rhino poaching in South Africa that remains in stark difference with other species 
being poached and trafficked, and so equally or more endangered), where focus of 
rhino conservation as a capital and potential option for international trade become a 
driver of securitisation.  
South Africa is home to almost 80 per cent (Emslie et al., 2016: 1) of the global 
population of rhinoceroses (hereafter referred to as rhino). In response to poaching of 
a species whose products are treated as the most valuable commodity in the world9, 
the country has undertaken measures that several scholars see partially as green 
militarisation or green violence. However, none of the research offers a focus on the 
mechanisms producing such processes in the South African context. Securitisation 
theory, the nuances of which will be defined in the following paragraphs, offers a 
comprehensive explanation of the security language that has entered discourse on 
natural conservation.  
The response to rhino poaching in South Africa, as I will show in further chapter, 
transcends traditional conservation concerns, with the issue being discussed as a 
national security threat and defence from foreign nationals, and as regards the 
extraordinary measures that have to be undertaken to tackle it. It is heavily influenced 
by global environmental politics, merging environment and security into one concept. 
Most interestingly, it creates a market where exceptional measures are used to secure 
not only the very existence of the species, but also multimillion rand deals portrayed 
as conservation and part of a struggle against illegal wildlife trade. This convergence 
of politics, business, conservation and security can be analysed thoroughly and fully 
                                                          
9 There are various reports on the rhino horn price, some (Rademeyer, 2016b; Hubschle, 2016) 
suggest from $25,000 to $ 65,000 per kilogram. The rhino market also includes other derivates, like 




through the prism of securitisation. Before I explain a specific theoretical approach, a 
wide horizon of security and securitisation studies needs to be explained.  
Securitisation’s theoretical approach has, since its development, taken many different 
avenues. Some scholars (Weaver, 2004) distinguish between the Copenhagen, Paris 
and Welsh or Aberystwyth (sometimes referred to as critical security studies) 
‘schools’ of security studies, that focus on non-traditional security studies. The 
founding fathers of the such called ‘Copenhagen school’ (CS), Barry Buzan, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde, authors of the ‘Security: a new framework of analysis’ 
(1998) expanded security studies, arguing that the post-Cold War international 
security system became much more decentralised (Buzan, Waever &de Wilde, 1998: 
VI), hence they introduced a ‘security complex theory’ (Buzan, 1991) to explain the 
new emerging orders, which would incorporate environmental, political, societal and 
economic sectors in the analysis. Securitisation is presented as the ‘overflow of 
normal political logic’ preceded by exaggerated political focus, or politicisation, of 
the issue and produces a discourse of ‘existential threat’ that is performed through 
speech and accepted by the audience (1998: 24-5). The act itself is defined as a 
‘securitising move’. The ‘new framework of analysis’ is the point of departure for any 
further academic commentary.  
Critics see the ‘new framework of analysis’ as explaining the new phenomena with 
old theoretical apparatus (McDonald, 2008: 565). Other flaws include a lack of clear 
definitions of clear criteria of successful securitisation examples and consequently 
those of a desecuritisation. Floyd (2007: 337) argues, that these two processes cannot 
be arbitrarily treated as negative or positive, and its moral value ultimately depends 
on whether effects are improved the situation of a threatened object or worsened it. 
Finally, Hansen (2000), points out that the early writing on securitisation silences non-
existential (ontological) threats, such as identity or gender related. Moreover, she 
points out, that securitisation theory omits cases where speaking about security issue 
(which is one of the fundamental assumption of the early theory) brings further 
insecurity. All above broadly discussed in the literature of which main developments 
I present in following sections as the theory has been in development since 1998. 
In what Wæver (2004) considers to be the ‘Paris school’, academics including Didier 
Bigo, Anastassia Tsoukala, Ayse Ceyhan, and Elspeth Guild go further in their study 




structuralist tradition of Foucauldian ‘theory of governmentality’, which is how 
security is understood – as the way governments craft policies and manage insecurities 
(migrants, organised crime) by applying various restrictions. Furthermore, they tap 
into Bourdieu’s ‘theory of field’ (Bourdieu, 1982), where the field is a constellation 
of actors focused around common cause and power relations between them, as well 
as ways (practices) in which threats and measures to tackle them are produced. 
Interestingly, later Copenhagen scholar, Lene Hansen (2006), also points towards 
practices, rather than speech acts, as sources of securitisation. Moreover, she stresses 
a role of identities (representations of self and others) that contribute to motives which 
play a role in securitising practices. The Paris school is criticised by Rita Floyd (2006), 
who claims that Bigo’s and others’ understanding of security within the Foucauldian 
framework does not offer any new insights, but rather only propagates Foucault’s 
theory of government.  
The Aberystwyth’s or critical school of security studies, including Andrew Linklater, 
Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, reflect on the main arguments made by other 
schools, drawing on the Frankfurt school10 and Antonio Gramsci’s conceptions of the 
state and class, focusing on the ways individuals perceive and influence global 
security, through what Wyn Jones calls ‘emancipation’ (Wyn Jones, 1999).  
However, as Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2016: 498) and Bueger (2015: 5) 
counterargue, these ‘schools’ have since transformed and become more varied, 
bringing new academic approaches, critiques and fields of analysis. Below, I briefly 
outline the various takes on securitisation theory, its main elements, and identify 
which version of the theory I apply in my research. 
Consequently, scholars have discussed the essential theoretical weaknesses of the 
‘Copenhagen school’, which led to a development of new terminology and a 
redefinition of theoretical approaches11.  
                                                          
10 The Frankfurt School (German: Frankfurter Schule) or the Frankfurt circle -  is a school of social 
theory and philosophy partially associated with the Institute for Social Research at the Goethe 
University Frankfurt with many important names of social theory like: Jürgen Habermas or Theodor 
Adorno. Members advanced theory of social change and sought to understand conditions leading to 
more equal socio-political system based on Karl Marx school of thoughts.   
11 Namely: discursive or linguistic (speech acts) opposed to practice focused or non-linguistic 




The evolving character of theoretical attempts to problematise securitisation outlined 
above show that there are many theories (rather than one unified theory) of 
securitisation (Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, 2016: 496). Given this variety, I take 
recent developments in the discussion as the most mature form, that at the same time 
settle many of the contradictions. I use a sociological approach in my research, which 
I outline in detail in the following sub-chapter.  
 
 Definitions 
The scholarship of securitisation is dominated by voices supporting the sociological 
approach to the theory.12 According to Balzacq (2011:3), is: 
‘an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts 
(metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes 
emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitising actor, who 
works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of 
implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts and intuitions), about the 
critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the 
securitising actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the 
referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening 
complexion that a customised policy must be undertaken immediately 
to block this development.’  
The definition updates earlier concepts of securitisation and its components. 
Following this approach, it is necessary to define the main terms that build up and 
complement the definition presented, providing a necessary context to conceptually 
shift towards a practice-oriented model.  
 
2.2.1.1 Actors 
Both Copenhagen and post-Copenhagen commentators recognise actors, or agents, as 
main components of the securitisation theory. In the classical version, the role of an 
actor is to perform a securitisation move, that is, to trigger a strategic action by 
                                                          




announcing a threat (through speech act) and impose exceptional measures in order to 
secure the threat. The securitising move is seen as a successful if the audience 
(explained below) accepts it, essentially admitting that the exceptional measures are 
indeed necessary to deal with the threat.  
 
2.2.1.2 Audience  
The central element of securitisation theory is seen to be those who accept the 
exceptional measures in order to tackle the threat proclaimed by securitising actor. 
Scholars (Salter, 2008; Leonard & Kaunert, 2011) argue that, in fact, there are several 
audiences; for example: the public, the elite, the scientific community, amongst which 
at least one is identified as an enabling (agency). Balzacq (2011: 8-9) differentiates 
two main functions of these: providing moral support (for example the international 
community) and formal support, namely through legal instruments or policies (for 
example by voting). However, the problem of identification persists, because it is not 
always clear which element of the audience is the enabling one, and through which 
specific move. The discourse has therefore recently moved towards examining what 
Balzacq terms as power relations or configurations (2005:172). Indeed, both actors 
and audiences might possess differing capacities to pose and/or enable an issue as a 
threat. Moreover, securitising certain issues essentially enables specific actors to gain 
more power and control, as well as access to a variety of resources that would be 
inaccessible in a regular cause of action (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998: 25). This 
leads to a next important element within which all of the above is included.  
 
2.2.1.3  Context 
The Copenhagen school saw a ‘context’ as a sector- and historical conditions related 
linked to threat (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998). Drawing on that, Balzacq, 
Leonard and Ruzicka (2016: 503) identify context as directly influencing 
securitisation (for example an event) and macro-scale elements, including, inter alia, 
social structure, political discourse and institutions as well as practices that influence 
the way securitisation is perceived and performed. Importantly, the context should not 
be seen as state-centric, as it can include a variety of social structures and scales – 




international politics. Historical and cultural discourse performed through language 
and text as well as cultural practices, equally by audience and actors, is essential to 
understand the circumstances under which securitisation occurs. As such, it is not a 
duly planned and scrutinised process, but one where those involved inform each 
other’s discourses within a given historical and cultural perspective and reinforce the 
message of a threat by constantly negotiating its meaning (Balzacq, Leonard 
&Ruzicka: 504). 
 
2.2.1.4  Practices 
Balzacq (2011) outlines three assumptions of how the concept should be read. Firstly, 
the centrality of audience and its agency -  the audience is not merely an executor of 
the securitising actor’s move, but it has the power to reject it, and hence render it 
unsuccessful. Secondly, the co-dependency of agency and context, where linguistic 
content (including text) can modify the context, which in turn modifies the content, 
dipping into both the historical and cultural circumstances. Importantly, there can be 
multiple audiences and contexts that inform or merge with each other, depending on 
their capacity and power. Thirdly, analysing securitisation as an unplanned process, 
we can observe processes running underneath the discursive surface and enacted 
through instruments, predominantly policies and laws (Balzacq, 2011: 15).  
Put differently, securitisation can be carried out with the help of laws, policies or 
unwritten norms, which enable development of a security regime. These routinised 
practices are explained through Bourdieu’s habitus, that is, embodied rules and 
historical experiences within specific ‘field’ where power relations are negotiated 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 159). In the security context, habitus is seen as the way threat is 
thought of, understood and tackled by security practitioners (police or government); 
for example, how poaching as crime is understood and addressed. The second term, 
dispositif (dipositive) is a ‘heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, 
the said as much as the unsaid’ (Foucault, 1980: 194).  
In other words, dispositif is a conglomerate of institutions, laws and other 




is maintained; for example, how poaching is defined legally, scientifically and 
morally. Lastly, it is the ones who practice certain institutional arrangements and laws, 
but equally the positions of power between them.  
This process can be captured by mentioned concept of the field, understood as a 
dynamic collective of actors, and simultaneously, the positions in which they are 
related to each other. The field is constituted by agents (governments, non-
governmental organisations, experts or academics) who share ways of generating 
knowledge and strategies to solve certain problems, which, in general, are understood 
as ‘regimes of practices’. These agents stay in certain power positions relative to each 
other, based on accumulated power (symbolic, cultural, economic or bureaucratic) as 
well as based on their identity (state or non-state).  
 
2.2.1.5 Desecuritisation  
Neumann (2012) and Hansen (2012) addressed lack of specific criteria of a 
desecuritisation process. He points out that it is not simply a ‘negation of security’ as 
it does not offer any understanding of how such speech act would be produced 
(Neumann, 2012: 19). The security context does not simply diffuse itself, but it is 
rather transformed into less or more institutionalised regimes. First being violisation, 
where securitised issue falls into outbreaks of direct violence, the second being 
defined as diplomatisation, where the issue is becoming stabilised through diplomatic 
channels and peace governance logic.  
 
 Conclusion  
The above outlined approach allows us to bridge different takes on the theory, where 
the subjects of analysis are no longer discursive or non-discursive acts of specific 
actors, but aforementioned ‘regimes of practices’ that can be changed through 
securitising moves. Habitus and dispositif are important in the correct definition of 
regimes of practices. As such, field provides the habitus with a context, where power 
is constituted through instruments, like policies and laws (Balzacq, Leonard & 
Ruzicka, 2016: 504-507). Therefore, in this thesis I focus on practices as main items 




With the use of securitisation theory as presented above, I address an essential gap in 
understanding of practices of securitisation occurring in South Africa in relation to a 
response of illegal hunting or rhinos and their conservation. The narrative of threat 
and extraordinary measures that it should be addressed with –  an openly declared 
security approach that emerged within the last decade, resulting in myriads of policy 
instruments to tackle the crime, but without clarity on effective measures of successful 
eradication of it. With context-specific, historical and power relations – gives us 
grounds to assume that securitisation theory applicable, as it addresses all the above 
elements and places them in a fresh context. It enables a better interpretation of the 
aims of those involved in the process, as well as the timeline and the context, 
impossible to address through traditional security studies which does not capture 
dynamic and power-oriented analysis of a phenomenon. Furthermore, by doing so, it 
can serve as an instrument with which to dissect elements that trigger the process. It, 
in turn, gives a perspective on the future of securitised elements.  
In the next chapter, I outline the situation of anti-poaching efforts in South Africa 
through the lens of securitisation theory, identifying main themes to be analysed based 






 Methodology  
 
 Introduction 
This subchapter explains methodological approach to the research on securitisation 
and framework it employs.  Based on the theoretical chapter, where I explained 
various theoretical avenues the theory of securitisation (or as mentioned – theories) 
can take in order to fully explore the researched case. In this line I adopt Balzacq 
multidimensional methodological approach that I explain below.  
 
 Assumptions 
In this thesis, I apply a structurationist understanding of social context, where 
individuals or groups actions cannot be analysed without including their socio-cultural 
context (structure), because practices, individuals and groups inform social structure, 
and the same time, structure informs individual’s behaviour. In this sense structure is 
a medium and outcome of practices (Giddens, 1979: 5).  
 
 Limitations  
Informed by paradigmatic approach I fully recognise the limitations coming from this 
understanding of the social phenomena. As white Eastern European, despite of rich 
sociocultural experience across the continent, I acknowledge that, despite my best 
efforts, my understanding of historical, social and cultural facts about South Africa 
are limited because of my positionality. Similarly, I acknowledge, that my 
understanding of political phenomena that I aim to analyse might be a subject to such 
culturally sided analysis. To avoid cultural biases in the analysis I have decided to 
apply a research methodology that avoid direct fieldwork which would require much 
deeper and long-term preparation to the sites. An analysis of collected material 





 Research question  
The sphere of conservation across Africa has been undergoing some significant 
changes in the way the response to certain threats is being articulated and exercised. 
Within the last two decades, several countries in the region introduced methods that 
qualify as counter-insurgency strategies (Duffy, 2016). The most commonly described 
examples include growing militarisation of national parks and reserves’ forces due to 
increasing numbers of poached animals, including rhinoceros and elephants. I aim to 
focus specifically on the response to rhino poaching for the following reasons: firstly, 
South Africa is home to almost 80 per cent of this animal’s global population. 
Secondly, since 2010, statistics on illegal hunting (discussed in detail in the following 
chapter) across South Africa raised international concern about ways in which the 
species should be protected. Thirdly, in the space of one decade, the discourse of 
trafficking and hunting changed from conservation and habitat protection to being 
security based, and the phenomena has been redefined as a poaching crisis, a threat to 
survival – a national priority crime. These are identified as serious organised, 
commercial crimes as well as serious corruption and those requiring specialised skills 
(South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995). 
The number of policies and strategies dealing with rhino poaching specifically (aside 
from conservation and management) has exceeded the number of strategies in place 
for other endangered species considered.13 International interest in protection of this 
animal (along with elephant) go beyond interests in several other species, like 
pangolins or cycads.  
The rhinoceros is one of the most expensive animals due to estimated maintenance 
and security costs (African Rhino Range States’ African Rhino Conservation Plan 
[ARCP], 2016: 35)14, but it is still considered profitable due to its horn having a 
commodity status. Drawing on the available materials, I contend that elements of a 
securitised approach can be identified due to high value of the animal derivates on 
black market, high poaching statistics and attractive financial profits for state and non-
state actors. As Massé and Lunstrum argue, in Mozambique: ‘anti-poaching strategies 
translate into the creation of new securitized wildlife frontiers that dispossess already 
                                                          
13 Such as cycads, elephants and pangolins.  




vulnerable communities and concentrate capital in private hands’, wherein states 
deliberately delegate authority to private actors and security companies (2016: 236).  
Applying the rationale of above concept to South Africa as a main subject of analysis, 
I consider how the trajectory of a security narrative changes if there are potentially 
great gains at stake, for example through tourism or the sale of rhino horns. I 
hypothesise, that various south African actors dilute the issue of the illegal trade in 
rhino horn and its derivatives by deploying more boots on the ground, which as I will 
show in the next chapter, such approach have shown little effect. Secondly, plethora 
of policies and strategies that have provided a convenient tool in international 
negotiations over effective response to poaching surge and have built upon justifiable 
means through which poaching can be resolved South African (as oppose to others, 
less explored avenues, such as resolving the park conservation – land claims conflict). 
My interest is focused on these measures and processes that together create what can 
be called the securitisation of the conservation and anti-poaching response to illegal 
hunting and trafficking of rhinoceros’ horn, including derivatives. More interestingly, 
I ask what is the potential interest in securitising the response:  is it just a flawed case 
of production of bureaucracy with genuine will, but lack of enforcement skills? As 
specified in previous sections, there is a growing body of literature analysing various 
versions of securitisation across a range of countries, but what is missing is a 
comprehensive picture of the nature and measures applied in South Africa.  
 
 Framework of analysis  
Aiming to comprehensively answer my research question within the theoretical 
framework, there are many avenues through which I could have taken my response. 
Taking into account securitisation literature, a standard method of conducting the 
research would be through discourse analysis (Balzacq, 2011: 31). The method is 
defined as studying social phenomena understood as linguistic (including textual) and 
non-linguistic forms of expression that carry meaning, assumptions and power 
relations and helps to uncover them (Hardy, Harley & Phillip, 2004: 19). The power 
relations between objects or their ordering are linked to the fact that discourses 
produce and distribute relations (power) between subjects, objects (people or 




Considering the variety of theoretical approaches to securitisation, Balzacq (2011: 52) 
suggests, there should be a number of methods available for analysis such as case 
studies, ethnography, process tracing and content analysis, that are potentially helpful 
in grasping various angles and levels of securitisation processes and may not be 
uncovered if one is limited only to discourse analysis. For instance, the idea of a threat 
central to the securitisation case, defined through any of the above methods or a 
combination of them, can provide a comprehensive picture of what a given threat is 
and how it is occurring.  
In keeping with the ‘reflexive pluralism’ proposed by Balzacq and explained above, I 
aim to analyse selected material through discourse, document and content analysis, 
my approach to the latter two of which I explain below.  
Scholars (Prior, 2008; Bowen, 2009) propose document analysis as a way of looking 
at paper and electronic sources of information as social facts. Having their own agency 
(Prior, 2008: 824), documents are merely ‘[…] containers of content, but […] active 
agents in episodes of interaction and schemes of social organization.’ Here, similarly 
to practice theorists, documents are seen as tools that carry and enable given practice 
or practices. In this sense, using document analysis in this work is important for two 
reasons: firstly, they are used in analysis as having their own agency as tools 
(functional resource approach); secondly, they are used to organise development of 
knowledge and practices (archaeological approach) (Prior, 2008: 825).  
Put differently, practice theorists analyse through ‘field of practices’, exercised within 
and through dispositif and through agents’ habitus, in order to securitise the threat. 
Indeed, some scholars argue, that ‘[m]ore qualitative forms of content analysis that do 
not assume highly stable meanings of words but, rather, include a sensitivity to the 
usage of words and the context in which they are used are compatible with discourse 
analysis and can, in fact, be used within a broad discourse analytic methodology in 
the analysis of social reality’ (Hardy, Harley & Philips, 2004: 20).  
Naturally, discursive analysis is traditionally understood as a separate method15. 
Indeed, Laffey & Weldes (2004: 29) see discourse analysis and content analysis as 
                                                          
15 Wood and Kroger (2001) in Hardy, Harley and Phillips (2004: 20) read discourse analysis as a 
methodology; founded of social constructivist epistemology, they argue that social reality is actively 
constructed, rather than uncover, hence ‘[t]he study of the social thus becomes the study of how 




incompatible: discourse analysis is about ‘power and politics’ while content analysis 
focusses on patterns in documents, on ‘identifying content units (words, themes, 
stories and the like) and their clustering […].’ Hopf (2004), admits that content 
analysis can be treated as an element of more rigorous discourse analysis by treating 
the analysed reality much more broadly, so not only through produced texts, but also 
though meanings that these texts produced.  
Hence, to summarise the discussion on methods, I treat certain narratives occurring in 
different moments of space and time as part of the regimes of practices that are 
situated within a power relation to each other, both in space and time. For example, a 
government policy could be directed to a certain audience to produce a specific action 
(strict conservation zones), but these can be interpreted differently through time and 
other actors (militarised approaches in strict conservation zones are violating human 
rights discussed by researchers and media) which in turn produce a reaction (enhanced 
policy including community conservation) that seeks overwriting the critiqued 
practice.   
 
 Levels of analysis 
Given the variety of elements in the analysis of securitisation, it is important to 
identify those that are relevant. The three main levels offered by Balzacq (2009: 64) 
provide a useful framework, namely, agents, context and acts.  
 
2.3.6.1  Agents 
This layer of analysis tackles actors and audiences involved in securitisation: those 
who act as contributors or resistors, power relations of actors identified, personal and 
social identities that enable or limit actors, and finally what is threatened (referent 
object) and the threat (referent subject); that is, in case of my research, the rhinoceros 
population and poachers or transnational organised crime syndicated responsible for 
rhino poaching. This level equally concerns the audience. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, in light of regimes of practices, it is sometimes difficult to name actors and 




important to note, that the audience (as a distinctive feature) has two functions: 
providing moral and formal support.  
 
2.3.6.2 Context 
A strategic component of the trio that provides a comprehensive picture of 
securitisation. The securitisation of the anti-poaching response and conservation 
agenda for rhinoceroses in South Africa is seen socially and historically. Balzacq 
distinguishes two contexts: proximate (meetings, summits, interviews), understood as 
a setting, and distal – embracing the sociocultural dimension of the text (in this case, 
an intersection of class and race of people who are being suspected of poaching versus 
those who are seen as trophy hunters). 
The above three aspects can be then seen as functional or ontological (Balzacq, 2011: 
37). The first would imply the ‘how’ questions in analysis (for example, practices or 
storylines). The second – question ‘who’ (agents or power) and ‘what’ (idea or the 
map of the world offered). Context would emerge by answering questions of ‘where’ 
and ‘when’? 
Data triangulation in provided settings will be limited to comparing narratives of 
different actors claiming certain agencies within analysed context. Namely, I will be 
comparing governmental sources and narratives with those presented by what can be 
called independent ones – press articles, non-governmental organisations working 
with certain communities. 
 
2.3.6.3  Practices 
All discursive and non-discursive practices used by actors to succeed, dispositif 
(practices and tools) and policies that are effects of securitisation, including language, 
frames constructed (analogies, metaphors, stereotypes and others),  dispositif (a 
system of mechanisms in social body (or institution) which maintains or enhances the 
power of that body through  institutional, physical, and administrative mechanisms 
and knowledge structures) and policies that are effects of securitisation. Finally, 
specific outcomes generated by the process, namely – laws, policies and strategies. 




or field of practices as clusters of practices. Hence, using the scheme outlined by 
Balzacq (2009: 64) I will principally be examining how specific practices have been 
used to securitise the anti-poaching response in South Africa. By identifying answers 
to questions from the practice perspective, I will specifically be looking at:  
- Who has been involved in securitising acts and how?  
- What are these acts? Why are they generated? 
- What are the tools used or produced? 
- What are power relations between those involved and in what way do they 
influence the narrative? 
- What is the idea (map) of the world offered and by whom? 
The final question will be answered after the analysis has taken place: to what extent 
can the process of securitisation can be pronounced as successful and for whom? 
As mentioned above, the main focus will be on practices. These will be studied as 
separate cases creating milestones that flag the most important points of the process 
identified during the research.  
 
 Sources and timeframe 
The research includes sources that provide more comprehensive ideas or stories on 
the one hand, whilst enabling triangulation of data, where various sources will be used 
verify information and build the fuller picture of selected practices on the other.  
Data sources are clustered into seven main categories:  
- South African government and its agencies’ documents referring to conservation 
and poaching. This includes the Department of Environmental Affairs, South 
African Parks, South African Police Service, and especially the Directorate of 
Priority Crime; 
- Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Portfolio Committee of Environmental Affairs; 
- Media – publications, briefs, reports, articles, op-eds, videos and movies in online 
and traditional press/TV that refer to rhino poaching in South or Southern Africa; 
- Investigative journalism reports and books; 
- UN agencies’ reports, briefs and similar resources addressing wildlife crime, with 




- Institute and think tank publications commenting on poaching and security; 
- Non-governmental organisations and other bodies’ (local and international) 
projects, reports, statistics and research reports on rhino poaching and responses 
to it; 
- Academic research; 
- South African court cases on rhino conservation and related matters. 
The timeline selected for the analysis of data stretches from 2010 to August 2017. 
This is dictated by analysis of the security narrative that gained currency in Sub-
Saharan African conservation circles shortly after poaching statistics became 
concerning (Duffy, 2016: 24; Milliken, 2014: 16). 
In the following chapter I apply the explained method and present research outcomes 
in a framework indicated above. The general outline and context of security discourse 
in South Africa is explained from national and international perspective in what is 
combined into the field of practices performed by main agents involve in various 
power relations.  
 
 Conclusions 
In this chapter I explained different research venues of the securitisation theory and 
argued that it a valuable contribution to the studies on phenomena and mechanisms 
that are observed in todays’ South African conservation and anti-poaching 
approaches. As a wide field itself, I provided the most relevant elements f the theory 
that will be applied in further parts of this thesis and proposed a methodology that is 
a consequence of this theoretical approach. Given variety of methods proposed I 
argued that with this theoretical lens, a wide definition of the discourse analysis should 
be applied, that is one where documents are part of the discourse and should be then 
analysed within. Because I will be specifically focusing on rhino poaching responses 
in South Africa I provide a term case study to limit the research field. Finally, in 
methodological section I provide a framework of analysis that underscore three 
distinctive elements in exploring the securitisation case: the context, agents (actors 
and audience) and practices that create various discourses and assemblages, 
underpinned by politics of power. In the following chapter I give a detailed analysis 




explain developing character of the security processes, which I argue, have been 







CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
 
  Introduction 
In this part, I substantiate arguments on the development of a security narrative around 
rhino conservation and the anti-poaching agenda in South Africa with three 
subsections outlining elements of the analysis. I explain the context, agents (actors 
and audience) and finish with a description of security practices through which the 
response to the rhino survival threat was securitised between 2010 and 2017. I further 
discuss one of impacts of this development and its complicity in practices of neoliberal 
conservation, namely differing forms of green grabbing, in the case of South Africa. 
I conclude this chapter with a list of research findings. 
 
 Overview and context  
Inquiring into a multifaceted problem of wildlife poaching and trafficking globally, 
with many species of animals and plants critically endangered due to illicit activities, 
I chose to study a case of an animal of which horns and, to a lesser extent, other body 
parts are trafficked across countries and continents on a great scale (Emslie et al., 
2012: 2-4). The interest behind the inquiry is on the one hand dictated by the fact that 
South Africa has the highest number of rhinos in the world, and on the other, that the 
animal which became a national symbol and source of pride also created its biggest 
challenge. The two species of African rhinoceros (and subspecies) inhabit 11 
countries of the continent with a white rhino population estimated at around 20,378 
and black rhino with population of 5,250. Of that number, almost 80 per cent16 are 
concentrated in South Africa with approximately 20,000 or fewer animals17. Between 
                                                          
16 Asian populations of rhinoceros are estimated at less than 3,700 across three subspecies: greater 
one-horned, Sumatran and Javan rhino. See (Emslie et al., 20122016) 
17 The recent report from the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN SSC) African and Asian Rhino 
Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat pursuant to Resolution Conf. 9.14 (Rev. 
CoP15) prepared for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) 17th Conference of the Parties (CoP17) concluded that as of 2015 the numbers of 





6,649 and 7,830 white rhinos and 349 – 465 black rhinos (Molewa, 2017a) lived in 
Kruger National Park in 2016. More than 30 per cent of the South African population 
belongs to private owners. About 0,5 per cent is managed by communities (Ferreira, 
2016). Amongst 11 range states18, four had the species reintroduced and two 
introduced (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). Rhinos, along with almost 3,600 other species, 
are protected by CITES, which prohibits the international trade of horns and derivates 
since 197719. In 2013, South Africa proposed legalisation of the rhino horn trade and 
its derivates, but in 2016, the government decided to withdraw their proposal. A 
sudden spike in poaching in 2008 was met with growing concerns from international 
environmental and intergovernmental organisations as well as the South African 
government. During this time, the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
explored various solutions to curb rhino poaching, which has been advocated by 
several scholars.20  
 
3.2.1.1 Understanding the poaching phenomenon 
The main reason behind the rhino becoming an endangered species21 was 
unsustainable hunting in the colonial and post-colonial era However, the numbers of 
animals being poached (or illegally hunted) within the last decade raised concerns 
over their protection. South Africa’s numbers of poached animals within the last 17 
years show how illegal hunting trends developed. In 1990 statistics were low, but 
incidents of rhinos being killed for their horns started to rise significantly in 2008, 
when they twice exceeded the total poached in the previous year. The biggest loss in 
                                                          
Hübschle (2016a) provides lower number – 19,700 of both species, based on communication with 
one of the authors of above report.  
18 Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
19 CITES appendices provide regulation for international trade in species that are considered 
endangered according to various standards, protecting about 35,600 species. There are three 
appendices, which contain lists of animals considered and voted by parties (182 countries and 
European Union) requiring specific protection. The decision in made based on available data and 
reports prepared on that occasion. Parties meet every three years during the conference (CoP) to 
discuss and vote. CITES also consists of a Standing Committee. The Convention participates in the 
broader stream of activities aiming to curb illegal trade and is engaged in several networks and 
projects.   
20 See for example Biggs et al. (2013)  
21 According to IUCN RED List the former has a status of ‘near threatened’, while the latter is 





animals was recorded in 2014, but subsequently decreased between 2015 and the first 
half of 2017 (Emslie et al., 2016). Researchers22. explored ways in which nineteenth 
century colonial laws enabled hunting for the privileged, while prohibiting such 
activity to local populations (unless as a support) under the guise of environmental 
protection or to force them into labour: ‘[s]trategies to prevent Africans from hunting 
include(d) the condemnation of Africans as poachers’ with a deeper rooted 
assumption: that the pristine wilderness should be protected from irrational and 
uncontrollable local populations (Ramutsindela, 2003:43), through what is termed 
‘enclosure’ (Corson and MacDonald, 2012). Within this understanding, trophy 
hunting was seen as a ‘proper hunting’ if performed by colonisers (Adams, 2004: 31)  
Arising from such understanding of nature protection is idea of wildlife seen as a part 
of global commons. Conservationists, activists and cause-driven movements call on 
arms to protect ‘our’ rhinos, elephants or wildlife in general. The majority of 
supporters or headquarters are based in Western Europe or North America23, but South 
African home-grown groups are also active.24  
Legally, poaching of rhinos in considered a National Priority Crime since 2011  
(Molewa, 2013) and includes a range of ‘restricted activities involving listed 
threatened or protected species under National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity (NEMBA, 2004), including Threatened and Endangered Species (TOPS, 
2007) regulations25 and South African law under the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act (POCA, 1998)26. Activities most commonly mentioned as offences include: 
illegal hunting, possession of firearms, trespassing, intent to commit a crime or 
possession of rhino horns (DEA 2017a).  
 
                                                          
22 Inter alia Ellis (1994), Neumann (2004), Ramutsindela (2006), Essen (2016), Hubschle (2016b), 
however the field of analysis is much wider. See for instance the paragraphs on political ecology in 
Chapter 1. 
23 See Save the Rhino (n.d.), Born Free Foundation (n.d.)  or Wild Aid (n.d.) for example. 
24 Such as the Outraged South African Citizens Against Rhino Poaching (OSCAP) 
25 in line with sections: 56, 57, 97, 98, 102 of NEMBA (2004), TOPS: Amendment Regulations (2008) 
and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Regulations regarding 
prohibition of international trade (2010) 
26 As underlying offences that trigger the applicability of money laundering, in line with section 4, 5, 





Chart 1: Poaching Statistics 2000 - 2017 (NSSSRSA, 2010 & DEA, 2017a) 
 
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP, n.d.) notes that wildlife crime 
‘is not defined in any treaty, but is understood to refer to any environment related 
crime that involves the poaching, capture, collection or processing of animals and 
plants taken in contravention of national laws, and any subsequent trade in such 
animals and plants, including their derivatives or products’ (McLellan et al., 2014: 2) 
In 2010, CITES Secretariat, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 
n.d.), INTERPOL-ICPO (n.d.), World Bank (n.d.) and World Customs Organisation 
(WCO, n.d.) established the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime 
(ICCWC, n.d.), a network that has defined and steered the international agenda in, 
inter alia, rhino poaching and trafficking of parts27. The network stresses the 
transnational character of groups involved in rhino poaching and stresses effective 
law enforcement as one of the main factors in tackling the crime. The main challenge 
of such an understanding is rooted in various incoherent national level legal 
arrangements. 
Poaching and trafficking of rhino horn and other body parts has been widely 
analysed28 and is seen as a multifaceted issue that is an intersection of complex 
international markets flows between demand (China, Vietnam), transfer (Europe, 
African and South Asian countries), and supply countries (South Africa is seen as one 
                                                          
27 Organisations established separate units concerning wildlife crime in the remit of their work 
28 See for example: Eloff and Lemieux (2014), Essen, 2016, Hübschle (2016), Nurse (2016), Milliken 























































































of the hotspots). Main reasons include market demand from countries like China or 
Vietnam as a ‘traditional medicine’ or as a commodity (UNODC, 2016). Secondly, 
the problem is analysed as a transnational organised crime as regards criminal 
networks that are involved in such procedures. Finally, it is seen as a social 
phenomenon in that it provides analysis of social (and closely related economic) 
motivations including what Hübschle (2016a: 50) labels as ‘contested illegality’ – a 
perception of legal arrangements (national, global) as being not valid (and so 
contested) applying equally to demand, transit and supply countries, where different 
arguments would be used to contest the illegality of the trade. As an underlying issue, 
it explains corruption and challenges in efficient law enforcement. Although of great 
importance, the motive and drivers of rhino derivate trafficking are not the subject of 
this thesis, hence it will not be analysed in detail.  
 
3.2.1.2 South Africa’s journey to protect rhinos 
 
Efforts to re-establish critically endangered populations of different subspecies of 
rhino have been generally successful. From mid-1995, the country saw steady growth 
in numbers. In 2007, DEA installed the TOPS regulations that provided specific 
measures under which trade and hunting of, inter alia, rhinos, was allowed (TOPS: 
2007). Year later, the Moratorium on Rhino Horn (National Environmental 
Management Biodiversity Act (10/2004): Notice in terms of section 57 (2), 2009) or 
the ‘blanket ban’ was proposed for public consultation and promulgated in 2009, 
effectively closing the domestic rhino horn market. The decision came relatively 
quickly, considering the reports on rising numbers of poached animals, but knowledge 
of illegal hunting was not new. Rising numbers of incidents concerned the Kruger 
National Park authorities as early as mid-1990, with data going back to 1986 (Maggs 
& Greef, 1994).  
In light of the 1994 transformation, South Africa’s anti-poaching forces also changed: 




Species Protection Unit (ESPU) (Gosling, 2002)29 with a well-developed network of 
informants. After a dismantling in 2002, staff were retributed across smaller police 
stations in the country with only few finding employment in the Directorate of Special 
Operations (DSO), or Scorpions, reporting to the National Prosecution Authority 
(NPA) and Department of Justice (DoJ). Although extremely effective30, they were 
disbanded in 2008 after a merger with South African Police Services - a move that the 
public saw as being a way to undermine investigations into corruption of African 
National Congress (ANC) officials, the ruling party since 1994 (Mail & Guardian, 
2008) and eventually replaced by the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations 
(DCPI), also known as Hawks. The unit is delegated to investigate rhino poaching and 
trafficking with much lower conviction rate31.  
Shortly after, in 2010, the DEA introduced the National Strategy for Safety and 
Security of Rhinoceros in South Africa (NSSSRSA), that proposed protection and law 
enforcement strategies (DEA, 2010). The operational side was mainly delivered by 
Environmental Management Inspectors while Hawks were responsible for carrying 
out investigations. Simultaneously, an interim National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit 
(NCWRU) was created, co-managed by SANParks (Molewa, 2011). In the meantime, 
poaching statistics swelled to 333 animals killed that year across all park facilities. 
Exploring more comprehensive conservation strategies, in October 2010, during the 
Rhino Summit, the DEA agreed to appoint a feasibility study committee aiming to 
research the viability of the legal rhino horn trade. In the aftermath of the report 
(Taylor et al., 2014), an Inter-Ministerial Committee decided to sustain current 
policies and uphold the trade ban (Molewa, 2016a). Public deliberation held in 2015 
allowed opponents and proponents of the trade to express their dissatisfaction with 
                                                          
29 Within 13 years of operation, before wildlife crime became a growing issue, the unit at the time 
investigated 1,220 cases, made 1,668 arrests, confiscated 14 tonnes of ivory and 546 rhino horns 
and 46 tonnes of marine products, like abalone and thousands of rare plants, birds and reptiles 
(Reeve, 2002) 
30 DSO has a high success rate (over 90%)% based on the number of prosecutions to number of 
convictions; in the final year of operations, the unit convicted 171 out of 182 prosecutions (NPA, 
2008) 
31 However, according to National Prosecution Agency, the conviction rates are high. This can be 
explained by the fact that that the Agency defines conviction rate as percentage of wildlife crime 
cases where prosecuted were convicted compared to number of prosecutions. In other words, 
arrests that did not led to prosecutions were not included in the equation. For example, in 2015 
number of poached animals reached 1175 and 317 people were arrested. From this number only 54 
people were prosecuted and 48 convicted. If we take two last numbers, then the conviction rate is 




the ban, that, according to them, caused the trade to go underground (DEA, 2015b). 
This view is contested as ignoring semi-legal trade before the ban, and routes and 
operations leading to illegal rhino horn trade (Hübschle, 2016a: 299).  
A year later, in January 2011, interim NCWRU started to cooperate on rhino poaching 
investigations with the National Joint Operation Structure (NATJOINTS) (SAPS, 
2011) and eventually ceased activity a year later. NATJOINTS has been responsible 
for developing strategic responses to security threats related to immigration, service 
delivery protests since 2010, when they were assembled secure operations abound 
2010 World Cup (Omar, 2010) Due course the responsibility expanded to 
environmental crimes like poaching, which was declared a national priority crime in 
2011. There is no clarity as to which legislation or regulations mandate the 
establishment and activities of the body (Flanagan, 2016) or why police, intelligence 
and military are being merged into one organism - NATJOINTS (Duncan, 2014), to 
address environmental crimes. Logistically, NATJOINTS is coordinated by the 
Hawks (Molewa, 2013).  The ‘structure’ also involves South Africa National Defence 
Forces (SANDF), who, since 2011 (Martin, 2011) have been deploying soldiers in 
Kruger National Park (Department of Defence [DoD], 2011). Further governmental 
agencies involved in the ‘priority committee on rhino poaching’ are: Revenue 
Services (SARS), State Security Agency (SSA), the national Park Authority, Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA), Veterinary Services, Medicines Control Councils (MCC), 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), SANParks, and DEA.  
While NATJOINTS were focussing on interventions in most affected area, Kruger 
National Park, in the following two years, another bold move to curb poaching was 
made. In late 2012, General (Retired) Johan Jooste became a head of anti-poaching 
unit for 22 South African national parks. In a famous inaugural statement, he declared 
war on foreign nationals who poach rhinos in South Africa (SANParks, 2012). At that 
point, poaching statistics reached new levels – by the end of the year, 668 animals 
were poached. Not long after, in 2014, in support of provincial governments, the 
Cabinet approved the Integrated Strategic Management Approach (ISMA) for 
rhinoceros (Molewa, 2014a) to better address management issues. That was a change 
from previous Rhino Issue Management32 - a set of consultations with public, private 
                                                          
32 Although sound and comprehensive in content, it did not propose any coordinated solution. See 




rhino, land and reserve owners as well as the non-governmental sector. The approach 
(ISMA) covers four main areas of activities: compulsory interventions (anti-poaching 
measures); increasing rhino populations, international cooperation and long-term 
sustainability measures. The interventions were to be implemented by ‘security 
cluster’ (NATJOINTS)33. Moreover, as a part of the new approach, the Minister 
announced the creation of the Intensive Protection Zone (IPZ) in the southern part of 
the Kruger National Park. 4000 square kilometres, roughly a one fifth of the entire 
protected area, was a result of a R 255 million donation from the Howard G. Buffet 
Foundation in March 2014 (Joubert, 2015). It is worth noting that the IPZ is just one 
of three zones created in KNP: Composite Protection Zone (CPZ) shared with 
Mozambique and Joint Protection Zone (JPZ) involving Rangers United, 
communities, concession zone protection services (a buffer zone on the Mozambican 
side of the GLC) as well as Mozambican rangers’ units (Figure 1). A patchwork of 
various units and approaches comprises of surveillance and canine units to 
community-based approach with correspondingly varied armament.  
Meanwhile, NATJOINTS drafted a law enforcement arm of ISMA – the National 
Integrated Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking (NISCWT, 2017). The document 
reiterated wildlife crime, including poaching, as a national security threat but also 
stressed the whole society approach, including ‘communities’ as an effective way to 
combat poaching and trafficking. In November 2015, President Zuma further 
grounded the narrative by announcing to five thousand local community members 
that, ‘[s]aving the rhino may ultimately save all our communities from poverty, 
increased crime and suffering’ (DEA, 2015c). On the ground, the long-prepared Anti-
Poaching Unit (APU) was ready for deployment:  
‘The air wing, canine unit and special rangers were expanded and 
appropriate technologies acquired. The air and ground mobility was 
[sic!] enhanced and the capacity for night operations improved. This 
capability was deployed on a well thought out zoning approach to 
address the right priority areas at any one time. The investment started 
                                                          
33 NATJOINTS is one of the seven operational teams of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security 
(JCPS) Cluster, or in short, the ‘security cluster’. The body gathers ministries of Justice and 
Correctional Services, Defence, Home Affairs, Police, and State Security. It aims to, inter alia, fight 




paying off and during that year rhino poaching figures could be 
stabilized for the first time since the start of the scourge’. (PMG, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 1: Zoning in Kruger National Park (Funda, 2016) 
 
On the information front, Minister Molewa ran several media briefings in 2015, 
aiming to promote the approach and successes that were to come with heavily armed 
ranger units and a security cluster as the brain of the operation. In statements, she was 
often joined by representatives from the cluster, also involved in presenting data on 
poaching or progress on the ‘rhino issue’ (Molewa, 2016c). This suggest that DEA 
was either pushing for co-accountability of the issue with agencies better equipped to 
tackle it or, that the department was seen by security actors as not capable to manage 
the issue. A process that initially stemmed from lack of legal tools evolved into 
political and financial over-focus on the issue. Direct references to national and human 







main perpetrators to be laid. These personified carriers of a threat have been used to 
unlock international funds allocated to combating wildlife crime and justify neoliberal 
conservation. A year later, ahead of the CITES Conference of Parties (COP17) in 
Johannesburg, DEA announced African Rhino Range States’ African Rhino 
Conservation Plan (ARCP), a document that reiterated many of the NSSSRSA and 
ISMA points, calling upon 11 range states for cooperation on effective anti-poaching 
measures (DEA, 2016d). It has a solidly grounded narrative on poaching, yet there is 
no recognition of the key issues contributing to the problem, such as corruption and 
weak governance on provincial levels,34 which points towards distorted idea of the 
cause of the issue. COP17 participants were also presented the draft NISCWT 
underscoring the importance of security and elimination of the threat (‘CITES CoP17: 
Untouchable? …’, 2016). However, on a different front a Rhino Laboratory, a one-
month meeting in 2016, gathered academics, NGOs and government representatives 
to deliberate on law enforcement, community engagement, legislation and anti-
poaching. The shift from strictly security-based to a broader one can be observed in 
the documents (DEA, 2016c)35 which I will come to in later sections.  
 
 Agents  
The rising importance of security as a framework of rhino protection did not occur in 
a vacuum. The process of securitisation developed in phases and has been reinforced 
through constant negotiations of power between actors, audiences and alliances of 
these two around various interests. Narratives change and fluctuate depending on 
positions of power which agents take. These are negotiated through language and 
practices. In search of valid response to rhino poaching, main actors and audiences 
have been aligning themselves to different narratives, of which a prevalent one 
concerned threat and security, both in language and practices. It has resonated with 
experiences, identities and imagery of insecurities. White (2014: 459) defines the field 
of agents as a ‘transnational conservation community’. However, the researcher also 
highlights that a network of actors operates through discursive coalitions which are 
                                                          
34 In 2016 a two-part report from Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime, authored by 
Julian Rademeyer who is involved in the topic through his book, ‘Killing for Profit’ (2012), named 
corruption as one of the facilitators of wildlife crime; see Rademeyer (2016). 
35 There has been since an update on ISMA and Rhino Lab, see: Rhino Conservation Lab. Progress 




time bound and heterogenous. Indeed, to analyse specific practices, it is necessary to 
understand the positions of the most significant actors in the field. In the below 
sections, I explain the agents involved in regimes of practices and continue with 
explaining such regimes that effected the securitised rhino poaching agenda in South 
Africa.  
3.2.2.1 South African governmental agencies  
During the dawn of the ‘poaching crisis’ between 2006 and 2008, the then-Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) found itself in a questionable 
situation. Despite installing designated services, poaching statistics had not fallen. The 
trade ban of the rhino horn trade was the default way for the South African 
government to respond to the challenge.  
The later Department of Environmental Affairs, under the leadership of minister Edna 
Molewa since 2010, together with NATJOINTS have been main domestic arm in the 
securitisation process. First, by addressing the critique of South Africa’s rhino 
poaching response through tapping into the national security narrative, and secondly, 
by bringing the ‘security cluster’ - a powerful group concerning more than just the 
conservation of rhino populations. Rooted in formations like ESPU and tapping into 
apartheid policing methods, like in case of SAPS, the security substrate brought 
extraordinary measures to combat poachers. 
Poaching, seen as a form of environmental crime, was attempted to be tamed through 
legal ends. The shift from an unregulated domestic market (Hübschle, 2016: 257) to 
an illegal one set the scene for the subsequent involvement of SAPS, then SANDF, 
and finally a ‘security cluster’ - NATJOINTS, an incarnation of the Scorpions. Aside 
from joining forces with security, intelligence and military communities, the domestic 



















2008/09 0 0 0 
2009/10 0 0 0 
2010/11 0 0 0 
2011/12 R 3 000 000 R 2 000 000 R 5 000 000 
2012/13 R 8 000 000 R 8 000 000 R 16 000 000 
2013/14 R 10 000 000 R 8 000 000 R 18 000 000 
2014/15 R 10 600 000 R 33 480 000 R 44 080 000 
2015/16 R 11 000 000 R 33 870 000 R 44 878 000 
2016/17 R 11 550 000 R 34 665 000 R 46 215 000 
2017/18 R 12 216 000 R 35 448 000 R 47 664 000 
Table 1: Department of Environmental Affairs and SANParks budgets allocated to 
Integrated Strategic Management Plan (PMG, 2015) 
 
3.2.2.2 Intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments  
UN agencies have played a crucial role in the process of development of 
environmental security. For the issue of rhino poaching, they brought security through 
claims of wildlife crime robbing countries from potential income, transnational 
organised crime (TOC) eroding the rule of law and states’ integrity, and finally, 
suggesting that aside from TOC, poachers and wildlife traffickers are linked to 
insurgent groups with alleged connections to terrorism (UNODC, 2016: 19). 
Of the most prominent, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and UN Environment 
Programme teamed with INTERPOL to issue various strategic publications, adding 
to the perception of wildlife as an international organised crime, a threat to national 
and international stability as well as broader human security (UNODC, 2016: 3). 
Along with their own agendas, five organisations clustered as ICCWC have been 
setting the tone in global wildlife crime discussions.  
In 2015, UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution which set a 
framework for collective action and coordination against wildlife crime (UNGA, Res. 




of communities and livelihoods.36 Two years later, in late 2017, the 71st UN resolution 
on wildlife trafficking (UNGA, Res.71/326) reiterated concerns about detrimental 
levels of rhinoceros poaching and the alarmingly high levels of killings of elephants 
and called on member states for firmer actions and counter-corruption programmes. 
Along with resolutions, UN was also a donor and facilitator of projects delivered in 
various countries on curbing wildlife crime. One of the main financial instruments 
that supported the anti-poaching response was the World Bank’s Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF). It has subsequently supported many initiatives of 
which the most important ones were: strengthening law enforcement capabilities 
(Global Environmental Facility [GEF], 2012; DEA, 2012) including Rhino 
Programme with the Electronic Rhino DNA Indexing System (Rhino DNA Indexing 
System [RhODIS], n.d.).   
In close collaboration with the UN and World Bank, state governments forged their 
own agendas that contributed to or defined the poaching and wildlife trafficking 
security threat. The focus on big mammals, or iconic species, included elephants and 
rhinos, along with big cats. The most prominent state players include the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Their actions shaped security practices on the anti-poaching 
agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa and influenced South Africa’s policies as described in 
subsequent sections.  
 
3.2.2.3 International Organisations  
The tone for discussing poaching as a security threat was partially set by international 
environmental organisations, which includes different legal entities collectively 
referenced non-governmental organisations (NGO) but equally linked to 
governments. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN, n.d.) has 
their own Species Survival Commission for African Rhino Specialist Group (AfRGS, 
n.d.) which, along with the Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network TRAFFIC (n.d.), 
provided reports on the status of rhino populations for CITES COP17 (2016) that 
                                                          
36 It draws on almost two years of the work of UN Group of Friends on Poaching and Illicit Wildlife 
Trafficking, co-chaired by Germany and Gabon, and a long series of meeting and international 
declarations on illegal wildlife trade including the 2013 Paris Declaration, the 2014 London 
Declaration, the 2015 Kasane Statement and the 2015 Brazzaville Declaration. See Polner & Moell, 





contributed to the decision to keep the rhino species on Appendix 1, except for the 
white rhino population of South Africa and Swaziland.37 In South Africa, the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF SA) is known for participation in variety of conservation of 
projects. The image of this organisation does not come without controversies. The 
most infamous one was Operation Lock, wherein former president of WWF, Prince 
Bernard of the Netherlands, assembled a task force of British mercenaries-turned-
poachers under the command of a Special Air Service (SAS) veteran in 1980s. 
SANDF. South African Defence Forces (SADF) and intelligence units were also 
involved in the operation (Ellis, 1994, Rademeyer, 2012)38. More recently, the 
organisation, supported by $5 million grant from Google and Peace Park Foundation 
(PPF, n.d.)) and the Lindbergh Foundation’s Air Shepherd (n.d.) programme, 
launched a drone monitoring trial in KNP (Nuwer, 2017), that has since been 
proclaimed as unsuccessful (Martin, 2017). 
One of the global actors has been the United for Wildlife, a campaign assembling a 
group of prominent wildlife focus organisations including WWF, Conservation 
International (CI), Fauna and Flora International (FFI), The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC), IUCN, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and Zoological Society London 
(ZSL). Established by Duke and Duchess of Cambridge, or Prince William Windsor 
and his wife, the organisation’s website asks: ‘whose side are you on?’. The campaign 
was part of the London Declaration in 2014 and ‘fights poachers’ ‘on the front line of 
the fight to save wildlife.’ (United for Wildlife, n.d.). For some scholars, an 
underpinning story that grounded the link in textual contexts was a 2012 Elephant 
Action League’s report (Kalron & Crosta, 2012) that led to establishment the 
‘poacher-as-terrorist narrative’ (Duffy, 2016) where ivory has been dubbed as ‘white 
gold of jihad’.39 A catchy title repeated in numerous further publications involved a 
terrorist group from Somalia - Al-Shabab – in the ivory nexus and gradually included 
                                                          
37 As we read: ‘For the exclusive purpose of allowing international trade in live animals to 
appropriate and acceptable destinations and hunting trophies. All other specimens shall be deemed 
to be specimens of species included in Appendix I and the trade in them shall be regulated 
accordingly’ See CITES (2017) 
38 The South African branch of WWF was created on the foundation of another organisation – South 
African Nature Foundation. It was led by Anton Rupert, a good friend of Prince Bernard and founder 
of Peace Parks Foundation (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016: 7) 
39 Notably, the organisation re-published the report in 2016 explaining that they never denied more 
substantial forms of income for Al-Shabbab than ivory, suggesting that charcoal (EAL, 2016) as a 
source of finances, also mentioned in UNEP-INTERPOL report, is much more important. Haenlein, 




other poached and trafficked species, such as rhinos. The narrative fluctuates in two 
directions. A poacher- terrorist link recognised as security threat or the human- nature 
threat withdraws from offering terrorism as one of them. The latter was successfully 
utilised by conservation organisations by making the problem more relevant and 
linked to broader issues (White, 2014: 462). More generally, by using the 
environmental crisis narrative interchangeably with a poaching surge, wildlife crime 
crisis and similarly emotional appealing formulations of a story of ‘destroyed 
wilderness’ or ‘butchered animals’, a plethora of organisations have been using a 
marketing strategy to boost their financial situation in a ‘conservation spectacle’ 
(Igoe, Neves and Brockington, 2010: 498). Those strategies have also been 
successfully applied by the private sector (MacDonald, 2010).  
A separate group, although organically linked to international organisations and the 
story they tell, are single or various animal-cause related activists and their supporters 
clustered in official or non-official movements. They form substantial audience for 
international organisations. Most prominent include groups whose main activities 
concern advocating animal rights, ivory or rhino horn bans. They are instituting what 
is being described by political ecologists, as defenders of wilderness, also actively 
involved in a production of narrative of a poacher and a necessity of desperate 
measures to protect ‘our wildlife’. 
March for Elephants and Rhinos (n.d.)  or Outraged SA Citizens Against Rhino 
Poaching (OSCAP, n.d.) are just a few examples of such groups. Although mostly 
restricted to social media messaging and campaigns, they also organise protests and 
marches to support their cause. They are informed by bigger global conservationists’ 
organisations, well established in Africa, which target smaller groups and various 
individuals with emotion-based messages. Because of their unstructured and social 
media-based character, this group also includes the general public, who voice their 
opinions via social media and social campaigns, usually based in Western Europe or 
US, but not exclusively. This segment creates what in securitisation theory is called 
‘audience’, as they possess an agency as global customer and ‘trendsetters’ but are 
equally highly influenced by the narrative created in popular and social media. 
Programmes such as ‘Battleground: Rhino Wars’ (2013), ‘Ivory Game’ (2016) or 





3.2.2.4 Private security companies 
Organisations providing training and services aiming to secure private reserves and 
parks. Their range of activities vary from providing training for staff of national parks 
and aspiring rangers to providing security services to farms and private reserves and 
engaging in charity work through campaigns promoting a ‘villain – hero’ or ‘poacher 
– wildlife defender’ narrative (International Anti-Poaching Foundation [IAPF], n.d.). 
Of the few engaging in work for private game reserves or national parks at some point 
from 2010 onwards, I name the following: Hemmersbach Rhino Force (HRF, n.d.), 
Protrack Anti-Poaching Unit (n.d.), Hoedspruit Endangered Species Centre (HESC, 
n.d.), QUEMIC (n.d.) or Paramount Group (n.d.). The security nexus goes beyond 
conservation measures such as patrolling and tracking – these charities and private 
ventures have access to surveillance technologies, arms and vehicles that provide 
opportunities for profit while protecting game reserves. Massé and Lunstrum (2016: 
234) explain how this private-public partnership worked on the Mozambican side of 
the Great Lebombo:  
‘The prominence of these private actors reflects the thoroughly 
neoliberal way in which Mozambique supports the creation of the 
GLC as a conservation-security apparatus. First, it has given the 
reserves’ private security forces a great deal of latitude in their rhino-
security efforts including the ability to conduct raids on communities, 
collect intelligence and engage in surveillance, deploy roadblocks, 
make arrests, and evict populations.’ 
Noteworthy, these organisations have often been established by former (and 
foreign) soldiers that have a little understanding of a socio-cultural realities.  
 
3.2.2.5 Private rhino owners and wildlife ranchers 
According to information on the Private Rhino Owners Association (PROA, n.d.) 
website, there are approximately 330 private game reserves with a total estimated area 
of 2 million hectares of land that own 35 per cent of the total rhino population in South 
Africa.  Proud of their contribution to preserving the species, members are also prone 
to benefitting from it. The story of private rhino owners and their involvement in the 




Rademeyer, 2012; Hübschle 2016a). Modus operandi includes primarily laundering 
rhino horns into the illegal Asian markets thank to porous borders, corrupted officials, 
veterinarians and legal loopholes providing a convenient opportunity for a lucrative 
business to flourish. In 2012, Johan Krüger, one of the biggest rhino breeders in South 
Africa, lodged a case against DEA’s moratorium on rhino horn and amended TOPS 
regulations (Krüger & Another v Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs & 
Others, 2012). Joined by John Hume, a fellow rhino breeder, they argued, inter alia, 
that as the biggest rhino breeders in the world, DEA failed to consult them personally 
and consultations set by the DEA were insufficient). The case was supported by 
Wildlife Ranching Association and Private Rhino Owners Association of South 
Africa. After the 2015 verdict overturning the blanket ban, DEA appealed to the 
Supreme and subsequently to the Constitutional Court. In March 2017, the latter 
dismissed the application to appeal the decision (Molewa, 2017c). Earlier that year, 
DEA gazetted draft regulations on rhino horn as a hunting trophy which would allow 
export of up to two horns for personal purposes abroad. It effectively undermines 
DEA’s rhino conservation intentions (Kotze, 2014a). Pinnock (2017) pointed out 
several issues with such installed legislation. He argues that personal, and not 
commercial, purposes are not sufficiently well defined, which creates the potential to 
illegally trade horns by those who bought or hunted rhino in South Africa.  In the light 
of restored domestic rhino horn trade, John Hume opened the first online rhino horn 
auction (Rhino Auction, 2017). Actions of this group of actors highlight a lobby that 
is powerful enough to challenge national legislation and advocate for suitable changes 





 Assessing the field of practices:  instruments and tools: from conservation to 
rhino security  
 
 The politics of extraordinary - rhino poaching as a threat  
Followed by a successful ‘Battle for the Elephants (2013), Animal Planet released 
their own ‘Battleground: Rhino Wars’ (2013). The series presented a group of 
American and local security forces combating poaching in Kruger National Park. It is 
full of images of killed, wounded and vividly mutilated animals, soldier-like men, 
guns and military technology in the ‘war against poachers’. The narrative, reproduced 
in a number of articles and media relations, features a clearly-defined hero and villain 
story, with no grey areas. Besides the EAL’s report linking poaching to terrorism, the 
transactional conservation community actively contributed to such framing. 
Intergovernmental agencies drew on their experience with successful discourses on 
environmental security. Early reports created a dramatic narrative of environmental 
crime crisis and threat, informing a UNEP-INTERPOL report in which the authors 
made a link between security and wildlife crime while implying inadequate capacities 
of the countries affected by the ‘crisis’ to justify the following framing:  
‘Legislation on environmental crimes in many countries is under-
developed. Sentencing guidelines typically address petty crimes and 
do not reflect the very serious nature and involvement of organised 
crime and the impacts it has on environment, economic and social 
development of the countries and local communities or populations. 
They do not take into account the sheer scale of loss of resources, 
money laundering or threats to state security involved.’ (Nellemann et 
al. 2014: 17). 
Another report, the content of which has been quoted in a myriad of sources40 is the 
2014 ‘UNEP Perspectives Illicit Wildlife Trafficking: Environmental, Economic and 
Social Issue’ (McLellan et al. 2014). First, the document stated that illicit trade in 
wildlife had become the fourth biggest commodity worldwide, estimated at $19 
                                                          
40 For example, 2016 UNODC World Wildlife Crime report or Institute for Security Studies Africa in 





billion annually, after drugs, human trafficking and counterfeiting.41 The claim was 
sourced in the US-based Global Financial Integrity (GFI) report by Haken (2011) who 
gathered the numbers based on variety of sources, including CITES, WWF, 
TRAFFIC, US State Department-supported Coalition Against Wildfeed Trafficking 
(CAWT), newspaper articles, which referenced CITES and WWF as well as activists 
(Colombo, 2003). More importantly, the report mentions insurgency groups in 
Africa42, profiting from poaching.  
By referencing the scale of illegal business and repeatedly referring to a ‘threat’, the 
UNEP report created a justification for a special focus on poaching and trafficking. 
The GFI Managing Director, in testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, wrote about a connection with terrorist group Al-Qaida, along with militias 
and drug gangs, which together created a threat to U.S. security (Cardamone, 2012). 
This ‘self-referential practice that does not refer to objective security threats outside 
itself’ (Floyd, 2008, 58) created strong storyline of a threat that contributed to 
justification of security solutions to the poaching problem.  International interests of 
foreign governments in the African continent have been strictly aligned with 
businesses, investments and assistance among many avenues of control. Following 
the establishment of a security threat (described in following section), the U.S. 
government’s former secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, upgraded poaching to a 
national security threat in late 2012 (Goldenberg, 2012). In the same year, by 
executive order of President Barack Obama, $10 million was granted (of which $3 
million to South Africa) to combat wildlife trafficking (The White House, 2013). Two 
years later, the Foreign Affairs Committee passed legislation that ‘strengthen[ed] 
National Security’ and, among many other points, ‘supports increased 
professionalization of partner countries’ wildlife law enforcement rangers on the front 
lines of the fight against poachers, who are often armed with night-vision goggles, 
heavy weaponry, and even helicopters.’ (Congress of the United States, 2016).  
The United Kingdom has been involved in variety of ways. In 2013, the government 
pledged £10 million to combat wildlife crime. Royal Foundations’ campaign United 
for Wildlife and their support for the cause shaped an idea of the problem for the UK 
                                                          
41 In fact, the Haken report provides numbers on wildlife, timber and fisheries that together give 
number of approximately $19 billion.  




and Western European audience. In the London Declaration, concerned governments 
reiterated international actions and urged affected counterparts to enforce stricter 
laws, naming rhinos and elephants as most affected species (UK Government, 2014). 
South Africa was not one of the signatories (‘The London Declaration’s Role …’, 
2014). In the statement, Minister Molewa used the opening session of the parliament 
as a reason for not attending the event. Reading further into the release, it is clear that 
South Africa and the UK government disagreed on issues of sustainable use, and that 
London favoured cessation. This was a signal for the international community that 
South Africa will not be dictated on their wildlife conservation policies (Molewa, 
2014). The minister and the government were delivering their own operations through 
NATJOINTS and the ISMA, that, on one hand, act as a proof for the international 
donors of seriousness in which the government is treating poaching and wildlife 
trafficking, while on the other, provided secrecy over the operations ran, should there 
be any doubt about effectiveness of operations, the national security was brought to 
discussion.  
It was not long before local and international media reiterated their opinion of the 
government’s strategy as being dubious due to international donations made by 
international governments (Kotze, 2014b). Although DEA did not accept terms of 
London declaration, it did accept a joint Swedish and Dutch postcode lottery ‘Dear 
Fund’ donation of R232 million (€15.4 million) handed to Peace Parks Foundation 
for a ‘multifaceted, comprehensive programme’43 in the same year. In the PPF 
announcement post, Archbishop Desmond Tutu called for saving rhinos which 
‘beautiful Africa’ needs (PPF, 2014).  
The way the narrative is framed exemplifies the PPF44 as being shown as saviours of 
poached animals and the African wilderness – a mechanism described in literature as 
‘producing wilderness’ (Neumann, 1998; Massé, 2016). Along with PPF and WWF, 
other smaller non-governmental organisations joined the ‘fight against rhino 
slaughter’. So have been private security companies, specialising in anti-poaching. 
The message collated is perpetrating a stereotypical view of wild Africa, extension of 
                                                          
43 That comprehensive programme included ‘intelligence gathering and technology applications 
such as conservation drones and other specialist’ (Molewa, 2014)  
44 A portion of funds helped in creating an ‘independent’ Wildlife Justice Commission, based in The 




rights to influence local anti-poaching activities and impacting both local and national 
politics by reproducing the colonial and apartheid systems of operations and forcing 
enclosure (Ramutsindela, 2007; Hübschle, 2016: 321; Annecke & Masubelele, 2016).  
The amount of pressure applied by international actors and the money invested into 
anti-poaching and anti-wildlife trafficking pushed the government to align its message 
with dominant players. Together with changing policies (NSSSRSA, RIM, ISMA and 
NISCWT) and attitudes, the language used by South African government agencies 
involved in anti-poaching strategy has also changed. Between 2010 and 2017 it shifted 
from poaching being described as an illegal activity towards more specific description 
of poachers, their links to transnational organised crimes, syndicates and insurgency. 
Before 2009, the language of media realises of the DEA and parks authorities was 
emotionally neutral. Early documents concerning rhino protection, such as 
NSSSRSA, offset facts and figures with emotional messaging. Poaching is used 
interchangeably with ‘illegal killing’, as in providing early statistics on incidents in 
across national parks and private reserves. The document mentions ‘involvement of 
highly organised and well-structured crime syndicates that are operating a lucrative 
international enterprise’ and ‘leakage’ of South African horns into the illegal 
international markets from stocks in the public and private sector (NSSSRSA, 2010). 
The strategy set up an ambitious, comprehensive outline of short and long-term goals, 
of which some relate to scientific and forensic analysis as well as law enforcement 
and international cooperation with bodies such as INTERPOL. At that time briefings 
on poaching were rare, and usually related to poaching statistics.45 
As indicated in the previous section, between the launch of the Integrated Strategic 
Management Approach in 2014 and 2017 the security language developed. The shift 
included more emotional arguments about impoverished communities, 
comprehensively supported by DEA’s and SANParks’ initiatives, which are at risk of 
recruitment for poaching activities. Simultaneously, the language became more 
militarised not only by describing ongoing on-ground militarisation, but employing 
expressions that denote military jargon, including phrases such as ‘war against 
poaching’ - ‘criminal gangs are armed to the teeth, well-funded and part of 
transnational syndicates who will stop at nothing to get their hands-on rhino horn’ 
                                                          




(DEA, 2015c). General Johan Jooste (Retired) admitted recently, that the use of 
language might have been more fortunate to depict the situation in national parks 
(Hübschle, 2017: 65). On the ground there is much more awareness of how language 
can form people’s (audiences) perceptions. 
Von Essen et al. (2014) unpacks what poaching is and how it functions in the academic 
and social sphere. She points towards a simplistic understanding of the phenomenon 
as a crime or deviance, instead of as a political phenomenon of defiance and 
radicalisation - rather than seeing poaching and those engaging with it as breaching 
an existing law, governments should look into social and historical drivers. Rural 
lifestyles and historical stigmatisation led to radicalisation that sought justification of 
their socio-political position, expressed, for example, through poaching. Although the 
DEA stressed in briefings that they support communities living adjacent to 
conservation areas or within parks, the briefings on specific examples of progress 
were limited. The programme dedicated to communities -  SANPArks ‘Parks and 
People’ (SANParks, n.d.), also offered scarce insight into how communities have been 
incentivised towards wildlife conservation by wildlife stock donations and creating 
employment through programmes. However, the DEA repeatedly stated that these 
communities were crucial to the long-term solution (Molewa, 2016a). While the 
language became more aligned, the content stopped producing statistics in order not 
to ‘upset’ international donors and the conservation community. In 10 media 
statements on Integrated Strategic Management Approach (ISMA) held between May 
2015 and Jul 2017, Minister Molewa was initially providing clear information 
regarding four areas of the approach. However, in 2016, briefings became less 
substantial – the number of arrests and convictions were replaced by successfully 
closed cases limited to few examples.46 That was a strategic move aimed to avoid 
discontent of the transnational conservation community, including donors.  
To summarise, the language of communication between the DEA and public changed 
between 2011 and early 2017, with 2015 marking the strongest, most conflict - based 
messages. The language of a threat imposed by powerful international actors was 
initially rejected by the department, yet, with multi-million donations supporting the 
anti-poaching efforts, the discourse eventually became dominant. At the same time, 
                                                          
46 See, for example, the last media release from September 2017: DEA (2017c), and earlier ones DEA 




further to a surge in crime that neither environmental departments nor law 
enforcement could cope with, the national response to poaching was to retreat to old 
well-known measures of policing and security threats. NATJOINTS was a strong 
message for international and local audience; this was the first phase of practices that 
led to securitisation.  
Through adopting the language of security, although for different purposes and with 
different meanings, a self-referential bubble where security threat moves outside the 
realm of normal politics was created (Floyd, 2008: 58). Internationally, poaching 
and wildlife trafficking have been linked to terrorism, insurgency and other forms of 
trafficking. In South Africa, it became a synonym of foreign influence and well 
organised syndicates. The parallel narrative of impoverished communities stands in 
a stark contrast with SAPS arrests statistics, where the majority of poachers are at 
the bottom of the illegal trade pyramid (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Levels of organised crime involved in the rhino horn trade according to 
police services (Milliken, 2014: 18) 
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the SAPS terminology, the fourth and the lowest level of the poaching-trafficking 
criminal pyramid. Similarly, the number of arrests or conviction rates do not reflect 
the level of forces involved in the rhino anti-poaching operations (see Table 2). The 
described process, where language and on ground tactics became militarised, shows 
that South African agencies were eager to actively respond to the issue, but 
proceeded with ineffective tools – policies that did not realise and law enforcement 
that did not bring anticipated results. In the following sections I further describe this 
situation.  
Year Rhino poached Arrests 
2011 448 232 
2012 668 267 
2013 1004 343 
2014 1215 386 
2015 1175 317 
2016 1054 668 
2017 1028 518 
Total 6592 2731 
Table 2: Number of poached rhinos between 2011 and 2017 compared with number 
of arrests made in the same period (DEA, 2017a) 
 
 Securitisation of the response to rhino poaching 
In the non-language sphere, the first phase of securitisation became evident by 
employing NATJOINTS in 2011, and its involvement in response to rhino poaching. 
Never before had security and the military been brought to the anti-poaching equation 
in South Africa. Secondly, despite the official mandate of the security cluster to lead 
the operations, it was only in late 2015 when NATJOINTS Priority Committee had 
stopped being chaired by Fundisile Mketeni, the DEA’s deputy director-general for 
biodiversity and conservation and currently the CEO of SANParks (Rademeyer, 
2016b: 22). This, together with aligning the language of the DEA to that of 
international donors, helped creating a unified message against wildlife crime and 




distinction of audience support, this move was aimed to gain international moral 
support (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016: 500). This brought more substantial – 
political and financial – forms of support. The closing element of the phase occurred 
when Minister Molewa was ‘joined by security cluster’ during the briefing on ISMA 
in 2016 (Molewa, 2016b).   
The move was met with a mixed response. Some local media and conservation 
charities welcomed it with relief while others questioned the necessity of security 
being involved in the rhino issue. Given that NATJOINTS were not able to point to a 
legal document that constituted their existence, it became a more general issue of the 
government’s transparency. At the same time, the involvement of security cluster in 
the rhino poaching response was perceived by the South African agencies as the right 
move and the best possible response to tackle the problem. Equipped with institutions 
(security cluster) and bureaucratic practices from apartheid (dispositif)47, punitive and 
policing practices (habitus) through years, was a default response to the supposed 
national security threat.48  
Rademeyer (2016b: 23) suggests that the reason behind the minimal effect of rhino 
anti-poaching and trafficking law enforcement is a case of the ‘silo effect’. Different 
agencies and police stations ‘sat’ on data but were not willing to cooperate. This, I 
argue, means that although security measures were applied (through security cluster, 
ISMA, language and finances focussing solely on rhino poaching response), the 
approach failed because of ineffective cooperation and bureaucracy which in turn 
provided yet another reason for securitisation. Failing to recognise it as the cause of 
the failure, exceptional measures became a justification of the uniqueness of rhino 
poaching.  
The process of securitisation has been multifaceted and included initial phase where 
international actors provided an understandable narrative of a security threat that was 
understood and accepted by South Africa. With their own take, the DEA realised that 
international involvement may bring potential funds to secure parks (and support the 
                                                          
47 See for example Du Plessis & Peté (2006) on during- and post- apartheid dysfunctional 
administration practices  
48 It is argued by scholars that this kind of response, together with neoliberal conservation methods 
and land acquisition, rather than eradication of poaching, brought a surge among impoverished 





solution for poaching), but it would come with a price of higher awareness 
internationally and continuous requirement for results. Given the lack of those 
between 2011 - 2014, NATJOINTS members lobbied for a more security-oriented 
solution, which took form of the ISMA and NISCWT. This was due to the South 
African agencies’ perception of poaching being a crime involving international 
syndicates, rather than complex socio-economic issue fuelled by an aggressive 
neoliberal conservation and powerful rhino owners’ lobby followed by multilevel 
corruption. At this stage, I argue, the securitisation process was less intentional and 
more of a default reaction to what was identified as a threat. However, creating 
NATJOINTS did not bring the anticipated drop in poaching numbers. The initial 2015 
briefings aiming to showcase the effectiveness of rhino security operations with 
became less frequent, starting from the end of 2016.49 When provided, Minister 
Molewa focused on arrests, occasionally mentioning ‘successful’ conviction rates 
(‘Latest Official South ...’, 2017). Later, in 2016, a handful of successful court cases 
were all that remained of success stories. By the end of July 2017, the DEA shared 
the last progress report of Strategic Management Approach with poaching statistics. 
Presented as a success, a total number of 529 rhinos have been poached in South 
Africa by June 2017 - 13 rhino fewer than the previous year and 34 per cent less in 
KNP comparing to the year before50. That highlights two potential situations: a) the 
total number of rhinos were in decline, so it was more difficult to poach them, 
especially in KNP where intensive anti-poaching activities took place; b) the ‘balloon 
effect’ – caused by the situation described in point a) – other parks are less protected 
and have more opportunities to hunt – therefore, poaching curbed in one place swelled 
in another. Equally, this could have been caused by overcrowded GLTFCA where 
approximately 12 rhino poaching groups operate at the same time (Wakefield, 2015). 
In the absence of more spectacular drops in numbers, the South African and 
international audience started suspecting something of a conspiracy (Chishakwe, 
2014). This was a clear sign of a loss in moral support (Head, 2017). The trend of 
hiding rather than revealing poaching statistics unveiled lack of deeper engagement 
with the topic characterised by ensuring numbers are monitored and released on time 
                                                          
49 By 2016 they were released approximately four times a year, but not necessarily every quarter. 
With the beginning of 2017, DEA started releasing statistics on six-month basis.  
50 The statistics for the full 2017 year of poached animals and arrests were released early in 2018. 




to keep the audience satisfied. Although moral support was undermined, there has not 
been a rejection of measures applied, however. Specifically, is it argued by Jooste, 
that the stark measures are necessity rather than option (Hubschle, 2017: 65) 
More interesting, however, is the narrative of ‘war on poaching’ that continues in 
international media (Burke, 2017; Bale, 2018) perpetuate the message that distorts the 
long journey that South Africa, along with many other African countries share in their 
attempts to preserve their wildlife. That, I argue, evidences the catalyst role of 
international organisations, governments and intergovernmental organisations in the 
securitisation process of anti-poaching response in South Africa, which has been 
entangled in the process of negotiating powers over what is, and what is not effective 
in tackling the wildlife crime.  
 
 Domestic power relations   
The domestic rhino horn trade was reinstated in South Africa in April 2017. A 
financial interest in revoking the ban was not questioned by the court. A recent case 
of the first online rhino auction (Rhino Horn Auction, 2017), which was firstly given 
a green light by a local authority, then halted by the DEA and then finally took place 
after a dramatic court decision, days before the launch. In the aftermath, John Hume 
complained that the auction was not a great success (Sommerville, 2017) because of 
the DEA’s (2017c) public reminder that the international rhino horn trade is not legal.  
Given the initial discontent of the powerful group of rhino owners, the DEA 
assembled a commission of inquiry looking into the viability of the rhino horn trade 
as early as 2010. That was a strategic move to avoid accusations of not allowing the 
best of all viable options. The recommendations suggested diverse options of which 
the Inter-Ministerial Committee chose two: application of current policies, with no 
immediate intention to trade rhino horn, but with the possibility of reconsidering the 
international option of trade if identified requirements are met. These include: 
enhanced security to be implemented through NISCWT, community empowerment, 
effective biological management, implemented, inter alia through adoption of ARCP 
horn management of stocks and the demand. Secondly, South Africa would not apply 
for the opening of legal commercial trade in rhino horn during CITES COP17 




However, in February 2017, the DEA gazetted a draft allowing rhino horn to be 
exported   as hunting trophy. In addition to this draft regulation, there were two more 
regarding the domestic rhino horn trade, prohibiting shaving and chopping of rhino 
horn. This was in line with CITES provisions that have the southern white rhino listed 
on Appendix II, hence are allowed to be traded, but only under strict regulations for 
trophy hunting purposes in South Africa or Swaziland. The draft was highly criticised 
by the media (‘Despite poaching …’, 2017), but the measure has not been since voted 
on, although the trade ban was revoked. The timing was no coincidence. Given the 
forthcoming lift of the ban, DEA anticipated that the market will be prone to 
laundering legally obtained horns into the international black market by converting 
the horn into powder or pieces (Moneron, Okes & Rademeyer, 2017).  I hypothesise 
that the DEA challenge has been not only international pressure, but equally domestic 
pro-trade groups with powerful connections and ample funding behind them. Equally, 
private game reserves owners participate in the conservation project by, for example, 
buying wildlife or removing fences in areas bordering national parks. Widened in such 
way, conservation corridors allow wildlife to roam freely and provide opportunities 
for tourism development. It is therefore unlikely that the DEA and rhino breeders are 
allies, but power relations between the DEA and rhino breeders show that their 
interests may overlap at some points. Yet, as shown in various sources (Rademeyer, 
2012; Rademeyer 2016a; 2016b; Hübschle, 2016a), corruption at lower levels 
amongst provincial administrations, parks, conservation professionals and rhino 
breeders and farmers, creates a powerful assemblage that practice illegal rhino horn 
trade and exercise political power games.  
Another ‘silent’ actor amidst an internal scramble over South Africa’s natural 
resources is identified as ‘local community’ in the literature. In DEA language, this 
vague term refers to people living adjacent to or in the park. These are the 
communities, that political ecology sees as the most vulnerable to neoliberal 
conservation attempts by transnational conservation community.  
I argue, that the implication of security narrative, both in language and practices, is 
being utilised by both international and South African actors that enables green 
accumulation, discussed in previous chapters. The process is less subtle in South 




from the park to create profitable ‘wilderness’51.  Mechanisms are place and time 
specific, but examples describe a general process in which land seen as conservation 
or nature-based tourism profitable is being acquired by the state via SANParks or by 
international organisations. Small land owners, farmers and dwellers as well as 
specific communities are promised benefits from the land via game or tourism, should 
they successfully restitute the land. This shows in the way SANParks annual report 
describe the process:  
‘Numerous communities have lodged claims against parcels of land 
within national parks. In some instances, the claims are still being 
verified while in others, the process has been completed and 
settlements effected. As part of the settlement agreements, SANParks 
has committed to develop and implement a beneficiation programme 
which will enable claimant communities to receive specified benefits.’ 
(SANParks, 2017: 7). 
An example of such practice is meticulously described by Ramutsindela and 
Shabangu (2013). Hailed as successful, the Makuleke land claim was finalised in late 
1990s. Yet, it was in opposition to SANParks plans for GLTFCA, eventually 
established in 2002. Although regaining the ownership, the community did not profit 
from the concession as it was projected. Effectively, the land was accumulated by the 
state and Peace Park Foundation. Furthermore, the authors suggest how 
commercialisation of SANParks in 2000 brought the fear that further land claims may 
jeopardise the integrity of the transfrontier park project, which was internationally 
donated and supported, nota bene, by Anton Rupert, and which was aimed to bring 
profit to the state. Such commercialisation can be seen as one example of neoliberal 
conservation, where nature is being seen as capital that should be reproduced52. 
Thakoli (2016) focusses on Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation Area and 
Greater Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area which, through a subsequent 
buyout of the land along the parks, in in the hands of the state along international 
                                                          
51 Lunstrum (2010), Massé (2016), Massé and Lunstrum (2016). 
52 We read ‘adopting the Commercialisation Strategy in 2000 was that competing social needs put a 
strain on the public revenue and nature conservation should leverage private sector investment 
through tourism development to partly fund its existence. The strategy led to 11 concessions sites, 
seven of which are in the KNP3, two in Addo Elephant National Park and two in Table Mountain 




organisation.  He argues that policing, exercised through interstate security 
agreements (here with Lesotho and Zimbabwe) enable encroachment under the 
disguise of surveillance against supposedly high-risk criminal activities (Thakholi, 
2016: 106). 
Rural dwellers, or communities, are often described as not being able to ‘perform’ 
conservation jobs or are not capable of conserving the nature and wildlife of their 
lands ‘properly’ (Ramutsindela, 2016a). Such pejorative labelling is then being 
extended to a risk of poaching (or at least subsistence hunting) and linked to security 
issues (Essen, 2014; White, 2014; Marijnen, 2017). Indeed, specific segments of 
society are shown as supporting ‘poaching’ and constitute a security threat (Duffy et 
al., 2016). Equally, framing of undefined ‘local populations’ or ‘local communities’ 
by international actors and audiences, imposing a security threat by linking them to 
terrorism and insurgency, framing native African populations as incapable of self-
governance and requiring assistance, have provided ground for structuring an 
international practice of justification of security in projects expanding conservation-
tourism areas. Hence, I conclude that security narrative has been a new addition to the 
international assemblage state and non- state actors’ techniques to forge neoliberal 
conservation in South Africa. Although not a main subject of the thesis, it 
substantiates argument of why and how domestic and international actors, although 
with different agendas, can benefit from imposed security threat.  
The above studies are only a small part of wide scholarship that prove that the South 
African conservation scene is full of powerful actors, going to great lengths to secure 
their interests. It also proves that securitisation is utilised to force interests of various 
actors, often negotiating their power among each other and those of audiences.  
 
 Findings 
Above research into the mechanisms of the securitised response to rhino poaching has 
proven to be a multi-layered and multi-actor issue. It has also been shown that the 
process is not simply linear, although proven to be time-related. Hence application of 
the ‘field of practices’ as an analytical tool helped in fleshing out singular practices. 
Through the described examples, themselves just an excerpt of information available, 




the development of an overall discourse of poaching as a threat and responses to the 
phenomenon. The research focussed on practices that represent these responses and 
the way South African governmental and international conservation organisations 
created agency to securitised rhino anti-poaching and embed it into a wider strategy 
of acquiring control over conservation projects. Below I present the full list of my 
findings:  
1. The initial phase of securitisation was triggered by foreign actors and aimed towards 
framing the issue of an abrupt spike in rhino poaching incidents as extraordinary in 
order to attract attention, finances and enable policies that would allow control of the 
issue via proxy measures. 
2. The subsequent phase of securitization was initiated when the DEA accepted the 
framing of poaching as a security threat due to the proximity of language and 
discourse that the international narrative offered – its own past and hard-line policing 
and response to crime. Yet, for the DEA, the aim was to secure international moral 
support and attract funds for the unprecedented phenomenon. Although the country 
introduced many policy tools and instruments (NSSSRSA, NCWRU, TOPS and trade 
ban), they have been proven to fail to fully address the complex issue. Hence the 
discussion of the viable solution, influenced by international actors, provided ground 
for subsequent application of security apparatus to rhino poaching.  
3. The evolving phase of the securitisation was triggered by assembling NATJOINTS, 
or the ‘security cluster’ and proclaiming rhino poaching as a national security threat, 
followed by declaring it a National Priority Crime. Soon after, the security cluster 
raise to prominence. As their main dispositif was deeply rooted in security tools, this 
is what they presented as an ultimate solution – a hard-line crime and threat combating 
response. This was fully in line with the international discourse of security issue. As 
the language of DEA and SANParks changed, the process became more embedded.  
4. The final stage (or the closing stage) of securitisation was a move from the minister 
of DEA, who in 2015 and early 2016 invited a list of security cluster representatives 
to departmental briefings in order to show commitment and that the security cluster 
was responsible for solving the issue. This was also a move to gain approval from 
increasingly discontented domestic and international actors, who were unimpressed 




at through frequent ISMA briefings. As the statistics of rhino poaching were not 
decreasing, information provided was gradually focussing on success stories and 
arrests statistics. The formations of NISCWT strategy contained a fully developed 
narrative on poaching and poachers as posing a threat to national security and those 
who guard wildlife.  
5. Against the backdrop of securitisation, one of the opportunities the DEA and other 
state agencies missed was realising that the security narrative can be used against 
those opposing large-scale conservation areas: land claimants, those in possession of 
lands adjacent to parks and reserves that are often specific communities. Although 
gaining control over land resources through conservation means was not a new 
process, the security nexus provided a fresh platform for capital accumulation. 
Presented as posing a risk, stimulating poaching or being vulnerable to poaching 
gangs, these groups were easier to marginalise, in order to pursue neoliberal 
conservation projects.  
6. Practices of securitisation sampled through analysis of the anti-poaching response 
suggest changing power relations between actors as they gain and lose power 
depending upon several contextual factors and a successfully instilled that have to be 
accepted by other players. In this sense, the securitised rhino poaching response may 
be overturned with a changing government and pressure from the international 
regime. I claim that it is not fully clear whether initially successful securitisation will 
devolve, or desecuritise, to reach a more accurate response to the multifaceted issue 
of wildlife crime. It will also stop being used as a proxy for land accumulation and 
deepening social inequalities in South Africa.  
7. Securitisation, war rhetoric and an arms race in order to ‘protect the rhino’ has had 
long term consequences, both directly as a way to forge neoliberal conservation and 
indirectly, by perpetuating power relations similar to those of the colonial order.  
Importantly, securitising the anti-poaching response brings a risk of not looking for 
other viable solutions. Securitised issues may have ended in an impasse, as in case of 
stable poaching statistics when only minor successes are recorded.  
 
8. Studying the securitisation mechanism allows us to go beyond the rhetoric of 




its reasons and consequences better than political ecology approach, which 
overemphasise language as a main medium of change. Finally, it allows us to 
investigate consequences of the securitised approach and measures potential impacts 







CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION 
 
Since 2010, South Africa has gone a long way in learning how to protect and capitalise 
on the natural resources the country is has in abundance. These resources include 
wildlife that is currently exposed to various risks, including poaching and trafficking. 
Within this research, I analysed the problem of a growing convergence of security and 
conservation, by employing securitisation theory. I have done so because of the 
evident discourse that employs security language, but equally to show that such 
security language does influence the sphere of policies and is entangled with power 
politics. My research question sought to address the security practices of the anti-
poaching agenda, that in South Africa has almost entirely focussed on rhinoceros.  
In chapter 1, I discussed literature that informs the current body of research and 
showed that, although academics engage with various phenomena at the intersection 
of conservation and security, there are still many interesting questions that need 
answering. These are, inter alia, how security and conservation are entangled and to 
what degree they are part of the bigger environmental security discourses that inform 
and influence the current discussion on means and aims of the response to wildlife 
crime. On many of them, I aimed to address only a small part. In chapter 2, I presented 
the theoretical and methodological approach. Through application of discourse and 
document analysis, I interrogated the South African historical and cultural context that 
created a facilitating ground for the global security narrative. I further outlined the 
actors and practices that produced a response to rhino-poaching throughout a specific 
time span. As a result, I have been able to identify much more complex power 
relations and more actors that have influenced the narrative. Specifically, the research 
showed that, although South African government agencies are heavily influenced by 
a global threat narrative, they did not accept the security narrative immediately, but 
over a course of five years. Secondly, there has been ongoing friction over how the 
poaching response should be framed between security cluster agencies, with the 
security response prevailing, as a well-established and historically tried practice of 
combating threats. On the global level, the changing language promoted poaching 
crisis, terrorism and threat as dominant themes, which gradually influenced South 
African politics. What has become evident is that the process of securitisation of the 




where actors like the U.S. used terrorism and insurgency as a way to deploy money 
and capacity building support as part of extraordinary measures to respond to an 
essentially produced threat.  
Gaining importance in forging such an understanding of the issue, intergovernmental 
agencies and the non-profit sector joined the choir. The research showed that investing 
money in the anti-poaching produced a more aligned response from the South African 
Department of Environmental Affairs, which, as a result accepted the security 
response as a dominant solution and pleasing the wider global audience. That was 
done to gain moral support and create and attract more international funding. 
Simultaneously, it showed that on the domestic level, there are also other factors, like 
corruption or an inefficient organisational culture which undermined responses to 
poaching and trafficking. Through a careful analysis of actors and power relations, I 
have shown that South Africa securitised its rhino anti-poaching response, because 
and through international actors, yet with strong pressure from local players. This has 
been shown through engagement of the security cluster, zoning of Kruger National 
Park and elevation of rhino poaching to national security threat.  
Finally, I showed, that although initially reluctant, South Africa embraced a 
securitised response and employed it as a new tool for the old struggle – that of land 
restitution. Security has successfully been applied as a factor that influences decisions 
as the DEA and SANParks are actively promoting the strategy of land acquisition, 
again, because and through international actors. In regards to the latter, the research 
also showed that green accumulation has many shades and forms that do not always 
come with or through violent means. Although on the national level, securitisation 
bears questionable implications for the society, internationally it was a seen as positive 
and necessary move. 
The research has also shown potential further ways to explore the topic of 
securitisation of the anti-poaching. First, the analysis can be used to examine other 
southern African countries. Secondly, by the theoretical focus on practices it allows 
to examine the extent of the phenomenon, including themes of environmental justice.  
Lastly, studies of securitised responses bear some policy implications. These point us 
towards the way in which international actors can desecuritise their environmental 




wildlife crime. For South Africa, there must be a better understanding of the role the 
country can play if they manage to apply more society-oriented solutions. For 
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